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Abstract 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a crime reduction approach 
that aims to prevent crime through the design (pre-build) or manipulation (post-build) of the 
built environment.  A staple food within the research pantry of academia and suggested as a 
main ingredient in the recipe to design out crime, yet rarely considered for the interior space 
of supermarkets and how the principles may deter shoplifters from committing crime. 
A space or environment is predominantly designed with the end user in mind; home buyers, 
the driver of a car, employees within an office, those that are the benefactors of a process that 
makes the user feel comfortable in their surroundings and induced to continue to use them.  
This is largely the case for the retail environment.  However, some shoplifting offenders are 
committing offences in the same space each day.  So, who are the main benefactors and users 
of the design and layout of retail environments – the shopper or the shoplifter? 
This research draws upon the experience of ex-shoplifters (n=5) in exploring their 
considerations, attractions and behaviour when committing theft from shop offences, 
specifically in supermarkets, in order to elicit how their decision-making is influenced by 
environmental design and physical cues.  It also explores the principles utilised by the interior 
space designers of supermarkets (n=2), in order to identify where designing out crime 
currently features within the process of determining the layout of the supermarket 
environment.      
The findings of the research suggest that the principles of CPTED are applicable within the 
supermarket environment and that the behaviour of offenders could be influenced by the 
effective implementation of these principles.  However, there is also a need to dispel the haze 
of ambiguity encircling some of the components of CPTED to assist clarity of application, 
understanding amongst practitioners and to encourage their subsequent use. 
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Introduction 
The Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles of defensible 
space, activity support, image, access control, surveillance and target hardening are applied to 
the built environment (Armitage, 2013; Cozens, 2014), but are rarely, if at all, utilised in 
shaping the interior layouts of supermarkets and retail sites.  The financial success of the 
Retail Sector is understandably based on sales, with design, as well product placement, within 
stores playing a major role in generating profit.  However, surely equal importance should be 
placed on the protection of those assets that ultimately generate the profits through effective 
design of interior space. 
The principles of CPTED, as outlined by Armitage (2013), should also be respectfully 
challenged, in order to ensure they are ‘fit for purpose’ in the current climate and within this 
less studied area of the supermarket environment.  With offenders also being ‘customers’ of a 
supermarket, the perceptions and considerations directing their behaviour and movement are 
crucial in terms of maximising the potential for design in preventing crime.  If we are to 
prevent we have to understand, and to understand we have to place ourselves in the mind of 
those committing the crime (Ekblom, 1997).  Offenders see things differently to practitioners 
(Cardone, 2006), they immerse themselves into their ‘profession’ and without complication 
they conduct their business to various levels of success, a degree of which will be attributed 
to poor design and layout.  Incorporating offender considerations into crime prevention 
practice is critical (Armitage 2013, 2016) and will be a key aspect of this exploratory 
research. 
The impact of ‘theft from shop’ is much greater than simply a cost to the retail sector, it could 
be perceived as a ‘gateway’ crime, an easy hit that potentially introduces an offender to crime 
and associated pay-offs (Pease, 2001).  What may begin as a dare whilst at school could 
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develop into a more serious addiction to the act of committing theft and the rewards 
associated with it by shoplifters.  The propensity to commit theft could then begin to manifest 
into other forms of criminality and if so, designing out crime as a deterrent within the 
supermarket environment has a significant role to play in reducing the opportunity for that to 
happen.   
The annual crime survey produced by the British Retail Consortium provides an overview of 
the biggest threats to the sector and those that are perceived to be of greatest concern over the 
following two years from publication.  As well as covering customer theft, the survey 
addresses issues such as fraud, cyber security, insider threat and violence against staff.  The 
results of the 2015 and 2016 surveys were based on samples accounting for over one million 
employees.  The direct cost of crime suffered by the retail industry was £613 million for the 
period 2014-15, which was calculated as the equivalent of 50,224 jobs in the sector, based on 
gross annual salaries (British Retail Consortium, 2016).  The direct financial cost of retail 
crime increased to £660 million for the 2015-16 period, £438 million of which was the total 
cost of customer theft affecting the industry, meaning theft remains the most common type of 
crime (British Retail Consortium, 2017). 
The British Retail Consortium annual crime surveys raise some interesting points in relation 
to industry and the police response to the problem of shop theft, some of which would 
suggest a cultural change is required, in order to bring the respective agencies together to 
proactively address the issue in true collaboration.  Relevant to this study from the most 
recent surveys include: 
 Businesses stated that they would like to see better police collaboration for the 
investigation of crime that crosses police force borders (British Retail Consortium, 
2016) 
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 The capability of law enforcement to respond to this kind of offending (customer 
theft) which crosses police force borders presents a significant challenge, but is one 
which must be met (British Retail Consortium, 2016) 
 Businesses continue to lack confidence in the police to respond to customer theft 
(British Retail Consortium, 2016) 
 43 per cent (of survey respondents) felt police perform a poor to very poor job at 
tackling the crime they experience (British Retail Consortium, 2016) 
 The continuing onward upward trend in theft is thought to relate to both the capacity 
of the UK police service to respond to this crime and the impact of international 
organised crime groups operating inside and outside the UK (British Retail 
Consortium, 2017) 
 An inconsistent police response to even violence to staff means that deterrence is seen 
to be failing, as there is a growing sense that offenders are able to act with impunity 
(British Retail Consortium, 2017) 
The findings demonstrate the cultural shift required in addressing shoplifting in the UK, as 
each of the findings focusses on post incident response, as opposed to pre incident 
prevention.  Although the British Retail Consortium crime surveys detail the average spend 
per retailer on crime prevention per annum, £3.1 million (2015) and £6.7 million (2016), the 
surveys fail to make any reference to design and layout, and the impact that this could 
potentially have in reducing the opportunity for shoplifting to occur in the first place.  The 
prevention of crime does feature, but only in general terms, making reference to the necessity 
to pursue in collaboration. 
When 66% of the direct financial cost of retail crime is attributed to customer theft (British 
Retail Consortium, 2017), something has to change in the approach currently being taken to 
prevent it.  Is CCTV an effective tool in preventing shoplifting or does it simply play a 
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supporting role in the investigation of a crime?  Is Electronic Article Surveillance (EAS) 
equipment really a deterrent to the shoplifter?  Are employees trained and utilised in the most 
effective manner?  Would retailers have needed to spend an average of £6.7 million each on 
crime prevention in 2016 if CPTED principles had been integrated into the process for the 
interior planning of space? 
The use of CPTED by practitioners in the retail sector, supported by additional opportunity 
reducing measures, would arguably not result in a conflict between delivering the primary 
objective of operational sales through an aesthetically pleasing environment and crime 
prevention (Crowe & Zahm, 1994).  In fact, it could be argued that CPTED would add a 
welcome dimension in enhancing customer experience, whilst creating an environment that 
would not entice offenders into committing shoplifting by reducing their opportunities to do 
so.  CPTED could be presented as a new opportunity to the designers of the interior space of 
supermarkets and may hold the potential to be the difference that is so obviously required?  
Conversely, is there a discharge of ambiguity and confusion radiating from CPTED 
principles, rendering it an unattractive proposition amongst those with the opportunity to 
apply them? 
The aim of this study is to further explore the component parts of CPTED (Armitage, 2013; 
Cozens, 2014) in specific relation to the potential to their potential application within the 
design process of planning the interior space of supermarkets, which has yet to really be 
established.  The research questions that will guide this study are: 1) Examine the current use 
of CPTED principles in the design of supermarket environments and identify what position 
they have in the design process?, 2) Elicit the perceptions of ex-shoplifting offenders on 
existing approaches to the design and layout of the supermarket environment, in order to 
establish the key facets of design that either deter or attract?, and 3) Identify the principles of 
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CPTED that deliver the most significant deterrent factor for shoplifters and how they could 
be integrated into the design process when planning the interior space of supermarkets?   
The perceptions of ex-offenders on the deterrent factor of features of design and layout, as 
well as retrofit solutions, will assist in exploring which CPTED components may be more 
meaningful in reducing the opportunity for crime in supermarkets than others.  Connecting 
the thoughts of ex-offenders, supermarket designers and findings yet to be explored by 
previous research will assist in furthering the debate of whether CPTED can make the 
transition from the built and exterior environments to interior space.         
Literature Review 
Designing Out Crime 
The ability to anticipate features of design that may result in opportunities being presented to 
offenders in committing crime is a crucial element of crime prevention.  Identifying how 
offenders may use aspects of design to their advantage requires a knowledge of their 
behavioural characteristics.  The comprehension of offender behaviour should flow 
throughout the design stage, from the initial brief provided by the client to the designers and 
those tasked with completing the development (Erol, Press, Cooper & Thomas, 2002).  
Identifying how features of design that are intended to shape an environment for legitimate 
users may also benefit offenders as abusers of the same space is highly important.  
Addressing the unintended consequences of design during or after the creation of the 
environment can prove difficult to remedy (Ekblom, 1997).  It is far better to have understood 
and prevented than to have misjudged and permitted.  However, it could be deemed relatively 
easy to incorporate facets of design to reduce the opportunity for crime to occur before an 
environment becomes operationally active.  Yet in the relation to supermarkets, do the users 
of the space change the dynamics of the design?  Similar to a house thought securer by design 
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becoming vulnerable once inhabited, as a result of a degree of apathy displayed towards 
physical security measures by the homeowners. 
The design of environments will always focus on the intended users of the space given that 
they will account for the majority of visitors to a site.  The failure to interpret unintended use 
by the minority could result in the irreversible erosion of an environment.  Designers, guided 
by a brief devoid of the consideration for crime-related matters, and little by way of 
supporting literature may unintentionally create a space that quickly falls into a state where 
the minority of abusers become the majority of users (Erol et al., 2002).  The consideration of 
crime-related matters in the process of design should emanate from the commissioners of the 
brief, demonstrating a determination to alleviate the opportunity for crime to occur (Ekblom, 
1997).  This applies as much to the interior design of a supermarket as it does any other 
environments, but the motivation of the designer will be determined by the organisation, 
operational sales and customer experience (as referenced during interviews with planners to 
be discussed later).  However, the importance of designing out crime in the supermarket 
environment goes beyond the act of purely preventing the offence.  One of the priorities for 
supermarkets is the health and wellbeing of their staff, and crime has a significant impact on 
those affected by it.  Reducing incidents of violence towards staff takes primacy for retailers 
(British Retail Consortium, 2017) and diminishing the opportunity for shoplifting may also 
reduce violence, if indeed committing theft from shop creates the additional opportunity for 
the violence to take place.  Shoplifting is perceived by those who commit it as a victimless 
crime, a thought possibly directed towards the supermarket as a corporate organisation, as 
opposed to the shop floor staff who deal the offenders.  Exposure to volatile offenders could 
create a feeling of vulnerability that in turn could lead to stress, anxiety and time off work for 
staff members, and impact on operational delivery to the supermarkets (Design & 
Technology Alliance Against Crime, 2011).  
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Lawrence (2004) makes some interesting statements in relation to designing out crime.  One 
of the key points made relates to the actual application of designing out crime and that if 
processes are to be adapted to utilise underlying principles then the “so what test” (p. 573) 
needs to be passed.  Lawrence (2004) questions the current approach to designing out crime 
and concludes: “the resounding answer is that it simply is not working” (p. 573).  There 
could be a number of reasons presented as to why this might be the case; those 
commissioning the design have an apathy towards such concerns, the designers focus too 
much on the user and aesthetic features or that the designing out of crime stops once the 
environment becomes operational.  Those charged with managing the environment, once 
operational, are as important in the continued designing out of crime, as the designers 
creating the original space.  Environments are dynamic in nature, as are the offenders’ intent 
on shaping them for their own purposes, so the suggestion that something can simply be 
designed out fails to reflect this and undermines the theory of designing out crime (Lawrence, 
2004).  
One of the critical points that can be overlooked when discussing crime within the 
supermarket environment, or that of other retail settings, is what impact does the crime being 
committed have on the wider community?  Felson & Clarke (1998) explore the theory that: 
“one crime produces opportunities for another” (p. 17).  The loss of £30 of petrol via a make 
off without payment may not overly concern the forecourt operator in terms of loss, but if the 
vehicle is then used during an armed robbery or to traffic human beings then the impact on 
society is much more than the initial £30 of fuel.  Similar could be said in relation to 
shoplifting; the loss of £30 worth of goods to a shoplifter may not be too much of an initial 
problem to a supermarket as long as it does not result in the acceptable percentage of loss 
being compromised.  However, this could then provide the shoplifter with the opportunity to 
sell the stolen goods to purchase illegal drugs, creating demand within the drugs market, the 
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profit from sales could be driving more organised criminality, all of which could have a 
major impact on the wider community.  Supermarkets conduct an amount of work within the 
immediate vicinity of their stores, demonstrating social responsibility in support of local 
communities.  Yet it could be argued that this responsibility should start from the outset of 
designing the interior space of the supermarket and the designing out of the opportunities for 
crime to occur in it.  Otherwise local communities may have to deal with a legacy of crime 
(Ekblom, 1997). 
The Design & Technology Alliance Against Crime (2010) posed the question: “What more 
can designers do?” (p. 32).  They go onto say: “Difficult as the situation seems, the fact 
remains that if the problems, outlined here are anything, they are design problems, embedded 
as they are in relationships between people, the spaces they inhabit, the objects that they use, 
and technology.  If problems are opportunities there are certainly design opportunities here” 
(p. 32).  Although there is rarely one organisation that can provide a complete solution in 
relation to the prevention of crime, ‘design’ certainly appears to be a common denominator; 
whether the initial planning of interior space of a supermarket, how loss prevention approach 
matters such as surveillance or indeed how the police develop and apply their response.  The 
responsibility of design sits with a number of stakeholders, all of whom arrive at the table 
with sometimes insular concerns.  However, only a true collaborative approach will assist the 
concept of designing out crime to realise the potential that it holds.  
Criminological Theory  
In attempting to understanding the characteristics of products that may make them a more 
attractive proposition for thieves Clarke (1999) presented the acronym CRAVED, 
summarised as: “ hot products must be concealable, removable, available, valuable, 
enjoyable and disposable” (p. vi).  With the supermarket in mind, how useful is CRAVED in 
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an environment where product ranges are vast and items freely available to take from the 
shelves?  Taking concealable as the initial component of CRAVED, there could be a 
misunderstanding that if a shoplifter cannot secret an item or items in their clothing or about 
themselves then it may be more difficult for them to steal the product in question (Clarke, 
1999).  However, surely something can also be concealed through deceit or distraction too, 
going beyond the necessity of a shoplifter having to put in a bag or inside clothing and 
rendering it fairly easy for them to conceal most items found within the supermarket 
environment.   
Clarke (1999) also makes the point in reference to the removable element of CRAVED that: 
“For instance, shoplifters are severely constrained in the number of bottles of whisky of 
packets of cigarettes they can steal without being noticed” (p. 25).  The severity of constraint 
may apply to the individual shoplifter on foot, but that does not account for the number of 
active shoplifters, those that use a trolley to remove goods, those that work in groups or those 
make a prompt exit through a fire door with a vehicle waiting outside.  Unless a system is in 
place whereby customers ‘pay and collect’ for alcohol within a supermarket then every bottle 
of alcohol is arguably removable.  Does the concept of CRAVED actually apply to goods 
sold in supermarkets? 
Is it actually the shoplifter who determines which products are hot or not?  The final 
component of CRAVED is important to a shoplifter, how and where are they going to dispose 
of the stolen goods and how much are they going to get for them?  If offenders indeed could 
be viewed as illicit entrepreneurs (Ekblom, 1997) would an entrepreneur ‘stock or sell’ 
something that was not consumer driven?  Whilst CRAVED may apply to other hot products, 
is a hybrid approach required when it comes to shoplifting that incorporates attributes relating 
both to the offender and the consumer?  For instance how does CRAVED take into account 
the economic climate, levels of income and a change to the benefits system or unemployment 
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perhaps?  None of these may apply to some shoplifters, but could apply to the consumers of 
their illicit entrepreneurship.  So who is it that actually determines what goods are hot and 
those that are not?  If the initial intention of CRAVED was to provide an indication of the 
inclinations of thieves, yet it could be argued that the buyer drives such preferences, has 
CRAVED omitted a key consideration (Smith & Clarke, 2018).  The challenge for retailers is 
how do they protect CRAVED items within their store, when arguably every item could be 
perceived that way?  Are they being let down by the products available to target harden 
goods?  Or is that one of the issues raised by Ekblom (1997) in that: “Designers have to 
undertake a major shift of perspective” has yet to materialise over twenty years later in 
relation to the interior space of a supermarket? 
Routine Activity Theory (RAT) (Cohen & Felson, 1979) could assist supermarkets in 
expanding their approach to product protection.  RAT is used by crime prevention 
practitioners and problem solvers as the theory that assists in dealing with the key 
components that converge to enable the opportunity for crime to occur.  The theory suggests 
that for any crime to occur there has to be a suitable target, a lack of a capable guardian and a 
motivated or likely offender.  These components have to converge at the same time and in the 
same place for crime to occur, and the challenge to users is to remove one to reduce such 
opportunity.  How could each of these components be viewed from the supermarkets 
perspective, what constitutes each of them within that environment?  Designers and Loss 
Prevention staff could arguably use RAT in a layered approach in addressing issues of shop 
theft, working outward in to enable a more focussed and consistent approach.  For instance, 
the supermarket itself could be a target, followed by particular areas within store and then at a 
micro level the products themselves, taking into account CRAVED. 
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Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
For the purposes of this research and to assist in attempting to help ensure the application of 
theory of research into practice and overcome what Reynald (2011) refers to as: “inflexibility 
in practical translation” (p. 70) of CPTED, the component parts of CPTED debated by 
Cozens et al. (2005), Ekblom (2011), Armitage (2013) and Cozens (2014) have been 
structured in a manner arguably more appropriate to the application in planning the interior 
space of supermarkets.  Therefore, the structure is as follows: Image, Activity Support, 
Access Control, Defensible Space, Surveillance and Target Hardening.  With much of the 
literature on CPTED focussed on housing and the application to exterior space, presenting the 
components in this manner assists in the preliminary transition of CPTED into an 
environment where application is largely untested or experimental at best.    
Definition 
Crowe & Zahm (1994) state that: “Crime Prevention through Environmental Design has 
emerged worldwide as one of the most promising and currently effective approaches to 
reducing opportunities for crime” (p.22).  Cozens, Saville & Hillier (2005) reported that: 
“CPTED is an increasingly fashionable approach and is being implemented on a global 
scale” (p. 328).  Crowe (2000) suggests: “the goal of CPTED is to reduce opportunities for 
crime that may be inherent in the design of structures or in the design of neighbourhoods”.  
Cozens (2014) redefined CPTED as: “A process for analysing and assessing crime risks in 
order to guide the design, management and use of the built environment (and products) to 
reduce crime and the fear of crime and to promote public health, sustainability and quality of 
life” (p. 11).  The extension of the definition of CPTED to include the positive impact that 
application can have on issues such as health and quality of life is an important step forward 
in attempting to secure the position of CPTED amongst practitioners.  Nevertheless, it could 
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be argued that there remains a haze of ambiguity encompassing the component parts, one that 
not only impedes the wider use of CPTED, but also the transition from academic research to 
becoming embedded within practice. 
Despite the numerous definitions of CPTED (Crowe & Zahm, 1994; Cozens et al. 2005; 
Armitage, 2013; Cozens, 2014) what does it actually mean to those deemed responsible for 
its application or those with the capability to do so?  Research, discussion, debate, challenge 
and deliberation are important facets in shaping CPTED, however, how often does this 
involve the end user and those benefitting from its application, or indeed misapplication?  
Bringing stakeholders into the design process (Design & Technology Alliance Against 
Crime, 2011) is a fundamental aspect of developing solutions, similar to the importance of 
partnership working in the public sector.  However, how frequently have practitioners 
assisted in a collaborative approach to defining CPTED and its component parts?  Could this 
be another reason why it has yet to establish itself as a key component in the designing of the 
interior space of supermarkets? 
In his paper entitled ‘reconstructing CPTED’ Ekblom (2011) debates each component part, 
making an interest point in relation to target hardening that could actually assist in answering 
the question posed by Cozens et al. (2005) “What is CPTED?” (p. 329).  The general 
definition of target hardening is making something more ‘resistant to attack’, but Ekblom 
(2011) explains that this appears “too narrow a concept”, preferring the “term 
manipulation” (p. 14).  It could be argued that in a supermarket environment if an offender is 
close enough to a target to be able to ‘attack’ or ‘manipulate’ it then is it not the case that the 
other component parts of CPTED failed?  In relation to this discussion, it could be suggested 
that the foundation of CPTED as a whole is to actually make something more ‘resistant to 
approach’ in the first place, inhibiting offender behaviour prior to manipulation and attack of 
the target.  The component elements of CPTED can then be restructured by the user in 
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alignment with what they are trying to resist approach to, whether houses on a residential 
estate, industrial units on commercial development, the play area of a recreational park or 
ultimately a product on the shelves of a supermarket.  Therefore, for users/practitioners, the 
answer to the question posed by Cozens et al. (2005) and definition of CPTED could 
potentially be that it is: ‘A set of guiding principles that ultimately aim to make something 
more resistant to approach’.  Bespoke definitions of each of the component parts can then be 
tailored to the environment being planned, adding clarity for specific application and 
overcoming uncertainty in routine use (Ekblom, 2011).   
Translation 
Crowe & Zahm (1994) stated that: “It will not be long before more people recognise the need 
for Crime Prevention through Environmental Design in decision making…The greatest 
impediment to the widespread use of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design is 
ignorance” (p. 27).  Is the “ignorance” alluded to by Crowe & Zahm (1994) the real reason 
why CPTED has yet to really feature in the use of interior planning for supermarkets or is it 
how CPTED currently translates?  Could this be in some part due to the debate presented on 
CPTED generally by Cozens et al. (2005) that: “the evidence currently available is 
inconclusive and much criticised” (p. 328).  Ekblom (2011) goes a step further in his 
suggestion that: “all six core concepts of CPTED are entangled and overlap” (p. 5).  
Therefore, although presented in a positive manner, it could be argued that until the 
confusion, implied by Ekblom (2011), is addressed with the end user in mind then CPTED 
will not realise its potential in the planning of interior space or potentially provide the 
evidence required to overcome the inconclusive position referred to by Cozens et al. (2005).   
Reynald (2011) also looked at the translation of CPTED into action, specifically in relation to 
active guardianship, which will be referred to later in this thesis.  However, the concept of 
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focussing on the transition from theory to practice is extremely important, in order to assist in 
overcoming some of the concerns relating to CPTED (Cozens et al., 2005; Ekblom, 2011).  
Reynald (2011) suggests: “researchers have argued that the mixed findings regarding the 
effectiveness of CPTED can be blamed on its inflexibility in practical translation” (p. 70).  Is 
it the case that CPTED is inflexible in practical translation or has it traditionally been 
translated into a language that is simply not understood by practitioners?  Crowe & Zahm 
(1994) touched on this in concluding: “CPTED is a self-evident concept that has been used 
successfully for many years.  Research and demonstration activities over the past 30 years 
have confirmed what many people think is just common sense” (p. 27).  If in 1994 CPTED 
was indeed “self-evident” and “just common sense” as Crowe & Zahm suggest, then why do 
others question the availability of evidence to truly evaluate it (Cozens et al., 2005), refer to 
an inflexibility in practical application (Reynald, 2011) and feel the need to have to 
deconstruct to reconstruct it (Ekblom, 2011)?  There will always be a need to challenge and 
evolve any theory, but if on one hand a concept is “common sense” (Crowe & Zahm, 1994), 
but on the other it appears there is “confusion in everyday usage” (Ekblom, 2011) then will 
CPTED ever be viewed as a reliable option for planners, and more specifically those who are 
responsible for the design of interior space within supermarkets? 
Components of CPTED 
In terms of the component parts of CPTED, Cozens et al. (2005) state them as Territoriality, 
Surveillance, Access Control, Target Hardening, Image/Maintenance and Activity Support 
(p. 330); Armitage (2013) presents the components as Defensible Space, Territoriality, 
Access Control, Surveillance, Target Hardening, Image and Activity Support and Cozens 
(2014) adapts the components stated by Cozens et al. (2005) to include Geographical 
Juxtaposition, which: “involves assessing the potential influence on crime levels, of proximal 
land-uses that may generate crime” (p. 26).  In reconstructing CPTED, Ekblom (2011) 
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focussed on Defence, Access Control, Hardening of Targets, Surveillance, Activity Support, 
Image and Management/Maintenance and Territoriality.  Ekblom (2011) concluded that his 
research had: “further highlighted some superficialities and confusions in the everyday usage 
of practitioners and researchers” (p. 19) and stated that: “I have not sought, here, to produce 
a final suite of formally-stated definitions, reserving that for a period of debate and reflection 
which I hope others will engage in” (p. 20) - maybe here lies the problem?  Without true 
engagement involving a range of stakeholders, will a universal definition of CPTED, 
underpinned by components that are ‘user friendly’ and stripped of complexity ever exist?  
Are the existing CPTED components designed for application to shape interior spaces or are 
they firmly ensconced in the design of exterior environments?   
“It seems likely that the re-definition of CPTED will be a key element in its future 
development” (Reynald, 2011, p. 80). 
It could be said that the confusion around CPTED alluded to by Ekblom (2011) partly 
emanates from a lack of definition and understanding in application generated from such, as 
opposed to the ignorance suggested by Crowe & Zahm (1994).  Lawrance (2004) uses the 
example of the tomb of the Unknown Warrior in Westminster Abbey to differentiate between 
public and private space, in essence the defensible space/territoriality components of CPTED.  
The basic premise of defensible space is to provide clarity to users of a space who should and 
should not be in it, in an attempt to deter potential offenders from accessing an environment, 
whilst providing the guardians of the space with additional opportunities to manage and 
monitor it.  The tomb in Westminster Abbey is surrounded by a wreath of poppies to which 
Lawrence refers to as “a very powerful defensible barrier between the public Abbey floor and 
the private memorial slab” (p. 575).  The symbolic nature of the poppy will emotionally 
connect with the vast majority of visitors to that site.  However, that same majority will not 
be intent on committing crime in that environment.  Surely the intention of a ‘visitor’ to a site 
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has to be taken into consideration when developing ‘defensible space’ or any of the existing 
CPTED components, and arguably little, if any correlation, can be drawn between the 
intention of visitors to Westminster Abbey and shoplifters in a supermarket environment or 
burglars in residential areas – the intention of their presence is completely different.  If an 
individual decided to visit the tomb of the Unknown Warrior with the intention of desecrating 
the memorial and thus being devoid of the emotive connection held by others, would the 
wreath of poppies described by Lawrence as a “very powerful defensible barrier” (p. 575) 
deter them?     
Image 
There could be a plausible case for each component of CPTED to be considered the most 
important, but the image that someone has of someone or something is arguably the starting 
point for many things in life.  Perceptions of someone or something are then usually 
generated from the original image, whether they turn out to be correct or not is another 
matter.  Beck (2016) commented on offender assessment, referencing several factors in their 
decision making process, one of which was: “the perceived risk (how likely is it that I will be 
caught?)” (p. 7).  Shoplifters will begin to make this assessment from what they can see at 
the immediate entrance to the supermarket, the outer layer of the environment or the shell of 
the building.  Their observations may include what security guards are on duty, are they in 
position at their podium, how busy, both in terms of shoppers and displays promoting the 
latest offers, is it and is there an opportunity created through inefficient practices.  Gill (2007) 
suggests that the first decision offenders will make is: “choosing the store” (p. 12), based on 
several factors and perceptions such as how: “hardened” (p. 13) the store is or: “level of 
security” (p. 14).  Cozens (2014) explained: “Image management refers to designing and 
maintaining the appearance of a space to have positive emotionally-driven behavioural 
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effects…it sends the visual statement that the space is managed and ‘cared for’ and certain 
behaviours are not tolerated” (p. 23). 
It could also be argued that some shoplifters will begin to form an image of a supermarket 
prior to standing at the entrance of it, how may access or egress points are there, do any of 
these points provide an advantage in terms of their movement away from the site via 
footpaths, proximity to busy precinct where they can blend easier or perhaps adjacent to a 
transport hub.  Such observations will contribute towards a shoplifter’s image of a 
supermarket in terms of their propensity to commit crime.  Designers should consider the 
environment in the immediate vicinity to the supermarket from a shoplifter’s perspective, just 
as they do for the customers when conversely closeness to a busy precinct or transport hub 
would be seen as a positive aspect in terms accessibility for legitimate users.  Beck (2016) 
suggested that: “…retailers are certainly able to influence the degree to which an offender 
feels like they may be caught” (p. 7).  Although a designer cannot do anything about the 
positioning of a transport hub, they can ensure that the main access and egress to the 
supermarket does not afford a straight run for the shoplifter.  This will have an impact on the 
shoplifter’s perception in relation to the overall image of the site.   
Ekblom (2011) deconstructs image management as a component part of CPTED, stating that 
image: “could attract or repel particular kinds of people, with individual criminal disposition 
or collective subculture” (p. 17) and that management: “is a task which may affect all kinds 
of crime opportunity afforded by the environment” (p. 17).  The concept of image 
management raises the question what image does the current ‘typical’ supermarket initially 
portray to shoplifters – apathy, opportunity, ease?  Cozens (2014) suggests that: “Image 
management seeks to promote a positive image and transmit positive signals to all users” (p. 
23), but within the supermarket environment what ‘positive’ signals are directed to offenders 
to suggest that: “certain behaviours are not tolerated”? (Cozens, 2014, p. 23).  The question 
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has to be asked: “What makes the store attractive to potential thieves and how can it be made 
less conducive to theft?”  (Design & Technology Alliance Against Crime, 2011, p. 82). 
Armitage (2013) explains that image is: “The principle of creating buildings/spaces which 
are physically free from litter, graffiti, vandalism and damage but are also areas without 
stigma or a poor social reputation” (p. 26).  Dissecting this definition arguably demonstrates 
the necessity of the continuation of designing out crime once the environment becomes 
operational.  In terms of a supermarket, the creation of the building and space is seen as the 
designer’s responsibility.  Ensuring that the created space is physically free from negative 
indicators that may provide the shoplifter with opportunities is the responsibility of the 
security guards and staff working within the environment, which could also include the 
shoppers.  If there is no synergy between the efforts of the designer and the guardians then 
the stigma and poor reputation (Armitage, 2013) of the site will develop amongst the 
shoplifting fraternity. 
Image plays a crucial part in the process of designing the interior space of a supermarket from 
the customer point of view.  First impressions count in terms of their perceptions and 
experience, it has to ‘look right’ to induce continued use.  However, it could be argued that 
image management in terms of the prevention of crime and making a supermarket more 
‘resistant to approach’ from an offenders point of view has yet to realise its full potential.  
‘Looking right’ in the eyes of an offender also induces continued misuse. 
Activity Support 
In relation to shoplifting there has to be a balanced approach to activity support.  Activity 
support for this thesis focusses on the role of shop floor staff and the legitimate users of the 
space (Armitage, 2013; Cozens, 2014).  However, as Cozens (2014) alludes to: “Activity 
support must be used with care because the increase in legitimate users might also actually 
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encourage and provide additional potential targets for crime” (p. 25).  Ekblom (2011) 
discusses legitimate users of space and: “Once there, they act as crime preventers by virtue” 
(p. 15) and that a role they can play is: “…perhaps by simply crowding out the space for 
offenders and offending” (p. 15).  It could be argued that this is not the case in a supermarket 
environment given that ‘crowding out a space’ can present opportunities to shoplifters.  Gill 
(2007) supported this further: “As noted while people posed a threat they also provided cover 
for their activities” (p. 14). 
Supermarkets cannot, nor would they want to, control the number of legitimate users of their 
environment.  However, arguably one of the key areas where activity support should be 
controlled as much as feasible within the supermarket is the immediate entrance area.  
Supermarkets often have offers in such areas or racks of clothing on sale, which certainly 
increases use of the space by legitimate users, but this in turn provides the shoplifters with 
concealment opportunities in an area of the store that is crucial in the approach to preventing 
shoplifting.  Sennewald & Christman (1992) argued that: “good customer service……is the 
simplest, and one of the most effective deterrents to shoplifting”.  Butler (1994) also 
suggested that: “it was the factor of people that most concerns the shoplifter”, with Palmer & 
Richardson (2009) stating: “The most recognized theft deterrent in the retail industry is 
customer service” (p. 19).  There will however be a percentage of shoplifters that will not be 
deterred by a simple ‘Hello’ how are you?  Is there anything I can help you with today?’  Is 
this approach more applicable within the intimacy of a smaller store or a corner shop perhaps, 
as opposed to a supermarket?     
There are several key points in relation to the above findings; customer service can begin at 
the entrance to a supermarket, but only if the design of the area enables it to happen and the 
supermarket have the staffing to afford to do so.  “The presence of retail staff nearby” (Gill, 
Bilby & Turbin, 1999, p. 35) differs from customer service at point of entry, as most shop 
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floor staff are primarily carrying out their core role within the organisation, as opposed to 
looking out for shoplifters.  Gill (2007) alludes to this in that: “At the retail ‘coal-face’, many 
non-security staff, including checkout assistants, sales staff and those responsible  for stock 
replenishment remain unaware of security and loss prevention issues” (p. 34).  Gill went 
onto say: “they did not appear especially motivated, by taking less interest in customers, they 
by association, take less interest in thieves” (p. 34).   
Despite some negativity existing regarding the role of staff in preventing shoplifting, Gill 
(2007) suggests that one of the key things that thieves rely on is the: “Failure to support staff 
with training and procedures” (p. 34).  Security guards and shop floor staff are the guardians 
of the supermarket environment on a day to day basis.  They need to be equipped with the 
right knowledge to proactively contribute to reducing the opportunities for shoplifters to 
commit theft, as well as having an unambiguous position on shoplifting from the organisation 
for which they work.  Staff also need to feel that their opinions are valued in addressing 
shoplifting, as they are in the unenviable position of dealing with the frustrations that 
shoplifters can create.  Without negating their responsibilities in carrying out the role they are 
employed to do, staff should have an understanding of the behavioural traits of shoplifters 
and be encouraged to ‘think thief’ (Ekblom, 1997) to prevent theft.  Being seen is a major 
consideration for shoplifters and an informed workforce can greatly assist in amplifying such 
a risk (Beck, 2016).      
Cozens (2014) references another example of activity support in: “Keep certain land-uses 
open beyond their normal operating times by subsidising them – so they can provide activity 
support to vulnerable spaces at vulnerable times” (p. 25).  The supermarket chains that 
participated in this research mostly have a café/restaurant facility within them, but the 
majority of them will close prior to the actual store.  Therefore, if the café/restaurant was 1) 
situated adjacent to the entrance/exit 2) designed in a way that promoted activity support 
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from legitimate users (shoppers) and 3) Was made available to local community groups to 
use after it closes, yet the store remains open, then this would add an additional layer of 
activity support in this key area of the environment in reducing the opportunity for crime to 
occur.  As Beck (2016) alludes to: “Numerous studies conclude that ‘people’ can play a very 
important role in amplifying risk” (p. 45). 
Access Control 
If access control is an approach actively seeking to prevent people from gaining entry to an 
environment (Armitage, 2013) then it could be argued that on face value it would be difficult 
to apply this component of CPTED to a supermarket, given the objective of the instore 
planners is predominantly invite people in.  Armitage (2013) goes onto explore the wider 
aims of this component of CPTED and probably the one most meaningful in the context of 
this paper is: “to make it more difficult for offenders to navigate into, out of and within an 
area should they select it as a target” (p. 25).  Therefore, access control goes beyond the 
simple notion of keeping people out and should be utilised to guide the users of a space 
through the environment (Cozens, 2014).  In basic crime prevention terms, access control is 
the practice of preventing unauthorised access to a space or environment, whether physical or 
virtual.  The prevention of unauthorised access to online bank accounts through the use of 
anti-virus software and strong passwords can reduce the opportunity for fraudulent activity on 
the account.  Reducing the opportunity for crime to occur is part of everyday life, which 
subconsciously the majority of people do through the act of locking the door to their home on 
leaving it unoccupied or going to bed for instance.  If lessening the chance of crime occurring 
was not important then no one would take such precautions (Felson & Clarke, 1998).  
Therefore, if an element of access control is to diminish the prospects of offenders in 
committing crime through increasing their risk (Cozens, 2014) then this strongly suggests 
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that access control needs to be explored further by designers responsible for the interior space 
of a supermarkets. 
Gill (2007) implies that the second phase of the ‘Shop Thieves’ Decision Circle’ is ‘Entering 
the Store’, suggesting that: “Getting away is a priority for offenders, so some assessment of 
the exit was commonly made” (p.15).  Arguably one of the main weaknesses in the design of 
some supermarkets is the provision of more than one access and egress point.  Although this 
may be deemed as a positive aspect of design to assist the legitimate users of the space, it is 
also without doubt a positive attribute in the eyes of a shoplifter, even more so when they do 
not have to egress through the checkouts (Clarke & Petrossian, 2013).  Risk is reduced for the 
shoplifter in supermarkets where there is more than one access and egress point, especially 
when these points are not supported through the presence of employees (Palmer & 
Richardson, 2009).    
Access control within a supermarket environment could be perceived to be a problematic 
component of CPTED to realistically introduce.  The supermarkets involved in this research 
have little by way of mechanical access control referred to by Cozens (2014) and are either 
completely open environments once immediately inside or in some cases have tokenistic 
barrier/gate combinations that provide little by way of directing movement or controlling 
behaviour (Geason & Wilson, 1992).  One UK supermarket chain operate a ‘one way in, one 
way out’ system, but this is by exception as opposed to the norm.  Their layout directs the 
customer through the entrance and around the store, having to then pass through the 
checkouts before exiting.  Subtle transparent screening compliments the design, ensuring that 
the ‘one way in, one way out’ system is followed.  Has this alternative to the open format that 
is seen in other supermarkets changed the customer experience to the detriment of operational 
sales?  Apparently not, as the chain in question were the fastest growing supermarket in the 
UK in October 2017 (Featherstone, 2017). 
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Geason & Wilson (1992) found that in relation to crime within shopping malls: “Thefts seem 
to occur in busy stores with easy access” (p. 52), whilst emphasising that: “Design influences 
people’s use of space, and in fact design is used to control behaviour” both relating to the 
user and abuser (p. 52).  Ekblom (2011) stated that: “Controllability of access is a casual 
property which depends on the configuration and nature of barriers and enclosures, and 
entry portals” (p. 13).  In relation to access control as a CPTED component both Ekblom 
(2011) and Armitage (2013) make the case for it to incorporate egress, with Armitage (2013) 
concluding that: “A more appropriate term might be ‘limitation’ of access, egress and 
through movement” (p. 25).  Therefore, given that abusers, and users, of a supermarket both 
traverse the interior environment to examine and inspect, there’s an argument to suggest that 
‘perambulation management’ may be a more appropriate term than ‘access control’.  
‘Perambulation management’ widens the use of this component of CPTED, encompasses the 
thoughts regarding general movement and egress (Gill, 2007; Ekblom 2011; Armitage, 2013 
& Cozens, 2014), and addresses the presence of an offender during their time in an 
environment, as opposed to purely at specific access points.      
Defensible Space 
Arguably one of the key issues faced by supermarkets in relation to the defensible space 
component of CPTED is the actual size of the environment, some of which are simply too big 
to potentially defend as a whole.  The supermarket environment is already designed on the 
principle of shops within a shop, with the floor space housing various different sections based 
around products and the associate sales link between them.  Therefore, if this concept exists 
to increase operational sales through association, why could it not exist to protect products 
through disassociation in terms of the offender being able to access them so freely?  Paying 
for items within a defensible shop within a shop would also prevent the shoplifter from 
removing the items from that area before attempting to conceal them elsewhere in the 
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supermarket or simply walking out without paying for them (Hayes, 1997a).  This approach 
would have to be developed with the legitimate user in mind too, so as not to deter them from 
purchasing high loss items, but could arguably be achieved through considerate design, with 
the supplementary advantage of crime prevention.     
Perhaps one of the most underutilised features of the interior space of the supermarket is the 
floor covering and how this could possibly assist in the creation of defensible space.  Very 
rarely, if at all, does the floor covering in supermarkets change colour or texture.  Subtle 
changes to either colour or texture could indicate an area of defensible space, assist staff in 
managing that space, whilst indicating to offenders that something has changed and breaking 
the familiarity of flow through an environment (Cozens, 2014).  It could be argued that when 
most people shop they are either looking at the produce on the shelves or down at a shopping 
list in their hand or on a mobile phone.  The same could be suggested for a shoplifter, as well 
as those offenders who simply move through a space avoiding eye contact and looking at the 
floor.  Therefore, a change to the colour or texture of the floor covering could potentially be 
noticed by the majority or all users of the space.  This is also a concept supported by the 
Design & Technology Alliance Against Crime (2011) when providing a specific example in 
relation to what they term “ATM Art”, stating that: “One solution to increase cashpoint 
safety has been to paint yellow road-marking style boxes on the pavement in front of the ATM 
to create a ‘defensible space’ for the cashpoint user” (p. 21).  This begs the question could 
the interior space of a supermarket become more defensible if zoned, only where required, in 
the sympathetic manner alluded to by the Design & Technology Alliance Against Crime 
(2011) and Cozens (2014)?   
Carmel-Gilfilen (2011) states that: “CPTED theory, specifically natural territorial 
reinforcement, tells us that people are more likely to guard a space that has clear boundary 
definition” (p. 34).  Supermarkets currently achieve a form of space/boundary definition at 
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the moment through product placement.  However, this is not designed to present the 
opportunity to defend space from a CPTED point of view.  With Carmel-Gilfilen (2011) 
presenting the finding that: “The present study found that nearly 80% of the shoplifters (with 
100% of the experts) acknowledge the role of the interior space on their shoplifting decisions 
and behaviour” (p.33) then surely, the potential ‘zoning’ of the interior space of a 
supermarket, through sympathetic means, should be explored further by those responsible for 
designing it? 
Defensible space created through zoning could be supported by a focussed implementation of 
other CPTED components such as activity support.  Staff working on the shop floor will 
already have their areas of responsibility, again this could be linked to product in some 
instances or the role that they actual carry out.  Therefore, they will already be aware of the 
concept of zoning through existing practices. However, from a defensible point of view these 
areas are too large to provide staff with the opportunity to protect the space effectively and 
there will be no sense of ownership (Ekblom, 2011; Armitage, 2013; Cozens, 2014).  
Supermarkets do have the opportunity to positively embrace this notion by the use of colour 
or texture to add or create definition to specific areas within the interior space.  Perhaps if 
they embraced this concept it could also lead to a more bespoke and efficient method of 
implementing surveillance in a more focussed manner.  “Shoplifters provided several reasons 
for CCTV’s inability to deter them.  One common line of reasoning is that most stores are too 
large for CCTV footage to be monitored effectively” (Lasky, Fisher & Jacques, 2017, p. 781). 
Surveillance 
Achieving natural surveillance within a supermarket environment could be perceived as 
difficult, not necessarily from a design point of view, but once the site becomes operational.  
It could be argued that some supermarkets aim to achieve an element of natural surveillance 
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through the traditional straight line formatting of aisles.  However, customers, staff 
replenishing the shelves and trollies full of stock soon remove the clear sight line created by 
the initial design.  Obstructions generated through use of the site for the intended purpose of 
shopping is largely unavoidable in a supermarket.  How supermarkets improve natural 
surveillance to encourage the informal surveillance opportunities for staff, and shoppers to an 
extent, is important in reducing the extent to which shoplifters can blend into an environment 
with relative ease.  Clarke & Petrossian (2013) also support this in stating that: “Store layout 
and displays must make it easier for staff to exercise effective surveillance” (p. 25).  They 
add that: “Eliminating clutter and obstructions” and: “Creating clear sight lines in aisles 
and reducing the height of displays” (p. 25) can also assist. 
Concealment plays a significant part in offender behaviour and supermarkets could be 
perceived as harbouring a multitude of opportunities.  The prospect of being seen is an 
important consideration for shoplifters, resulting in them having to potentially suspend their 
activities and leave a supermarket empty handed.  This would be deemed by some shoplifters 
stealing to finance an addiction as catastrophic depending on their state when offending.  In 
addition the formatting of aisles to enhance natural surveillance, a reduction in the height of 
shelving to prevent additional concealment opportunities may also assist (Cardone, 2006; 
Carmel-Gilfilen, 2011).  Yet again, how feasible is this in the supermarket environment?  
Every inch of shelf space is sales space, reducing heights of fixtures has the potential to have 
a serious impact on profit and supermarkets, in an extremely competitive sector, will be 
extremely reluctant to approve such a change to design despite the benefits to natural 
surveillance it has. 
Blind spots and that there is always a corner to be found in the supermarket environment is 
one of the foremost benefits for a shoplifter.  Unless there was a seismic shift of epic 
proportions in the designing of supermarkets it will be difficult for those responsible for the 
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planning of interior space to ever eradicate concealment opportunities presented by corners.  
Therefore, it would be very unfair to suggest that the designers had paid insufficient attention 
to design from an offender point of view in this instance (Gill 2007).  The design of the 
supermarket space around structural support such as columns can be taken into account 
though, as can the placement of banners and products that may inadvertently encourage the 
ghost like tendencies of some shoplifters in concealing themselves in an environment.  Such 
examples of poor natural surveillance were also supported by Palmer & Richardson (2009) 
when they referenced that stores at greater risk include those with:  “…displays that conceal 
boosters” and: “Blind areas that conceal boosters” (p. 9). 
Closed circuit television (CCTV) is one of the main default positions for improving 
surveillance within supermarkets.  CCTV is a popular technical approach to surveillance, 
used widely by Loss Prevention practitioners to cover areas that they perceive staff cannot.  
Described by Beck & Willis (1999) as a: “omnipresent, near-infallible robot eye in the sky” 
the reliance on CCTV has arguably reached the extent of alarming proportions within the 
supermarket environment, the majority of Loss Prevention resources being allocated to such 
technology (Design & Technology Alliance Against Crime, 2011). 
Cardone &Hayes (2011) stated that CCTV assists retailers in: “providing ‘eyes’ into hidden 
spaces” (p. 29), but does it?  There are arguably two consistently hidden spaces in larger 
stores, including supermarkets, that won’t be covered by CCTV; changing rooms and toilets, 
both of which may be accessible to shoplifters depending on the process management and 
presence of staff in relation to changing rooms, and the use of EAS at the entrances to the 
toilets.  Concealment is ultimately one of the major considerations of any offender, but does 
CCTV actually remove such opportunities in a preventative manner in supermarkets or is it 
simply a reactive tool to assist with post incident processes?  Gill et al. (1999) reported that: 
“our findings indicate that perceived risk associated with static CCTV cameras is low, with 
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33 (out of 38) respondents claiming that they would ‘never’ be deterred from shop theft if a 
store had cameras installed” (p. 33). 
As will be highlighted later in this thesis there is a common belief amongst shoplifters that 
cameras are only as good as the person watching them and that some supermarkets are just 
too big in terms of size for CCTV to be used effectively and efficiently.  It could be 
suggested that the almost blanket approach to covering a store with cameras has a negative 
impact in terms of the perceptions of  shoplifting offenders in that it’s impossible for fifty, 
sixty or seventy cameras to all be monitored effectively (Beck, 2016).  Gill (2007) further 
supported this by stating: “It is worth noting that some thieves believed that a lot of cameras 
in a store acted as a distraction to the loss prevention efforts as a camera operator could not 
possibly view all the cameras all of the time” (p. 27). 
The presence of CCTV is always supported by signage informing users of a supermarket that 
cameras are in operation.  The placement of signage confirms cameras are in situ, but not 
necessarily that they are being monitored.  From a shoplifters perspective the majority of 
them know that CCTV is feature of the security found within supermarkets, so ‘Smile 
Shoplifters you’re on camera’ and ‘Thieves we are watching you’ could all be perceived as 
wasted opportunities, meaning very little to some shoplifters.  Everyone knows that CCTV is 
used in stores and that shoplifting is a crime, so why tell someone something they already 
know and that appears to mean little by way of deterrent?  If there is a suggestion that 
cameras are being monitored it could arguably add to a sense of risk for the shoplifter 
(Cardone, 2006), but the risk will soon diminish if the activity of a shoplifter is not disrupted.  
It could actually be suggested that the camera does not watch, it simply captures and relays 
images for someone else to watch.  Therefore, if the technical and human facets of 
surveillance do not combine then a sign suggesting: “CCTV monitoring in use” would 
potentially deliver little by way of the risk amplification discussed by Beck (2016).  
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Security guards are used as a principal deterrent in reducing the opportunity for shoplifters to 
commit crime.  There may be occasions where a potential misconception among staff 
carrying out such roles is that they are more alive to a situation than the shoplifter that they 
are observing, or that the offender they are observing is the correct one to observe.  Some 
shoplifters allude to their own levels of surveillance and understanding in relation to guards 
and covert store detectives, with their own knowledge covering shift patterns, where guards 
are usually placed throughout the store and behavioural characteristics of covert employees.  
The number of guards, placement of them and their ability to cover the access and egress 
points to a supermarket adequately are all important factors in assessing their effectiveness 
(Beck, 2016).  Some supermarkets do not deploy guards throughout the opening hours of a 
store, preferring for duties to commence in alignment with perceived busy periods.  However, 
the effectiveness of uniformed security guards has been challenged (Clarke & Petrossian, 
2013) claiming that there is not enough evidence omitted by academic research.  Clarke & 
Petrossian (2013) went on to assertively state that: “Guard characteristics and behaviour are 
extremely important: poor guards have no effect on shoplifting” (p. 38). 
Despite criticism, guarding will also be a preferred option of the supermarkets.  There is no 
doubt that apathetic characteristics demonstrated by anyone when conducting themselves in 
their professional capacity will result in ineffective outcomes, but are all guards to blame for 
this?  Of course not and as with the technical aspect of surveillance provided by CCTV, 
guards are expected to cover a significant space in the interior of a supermarket.  Do they 
remain static by the access and egress point, is there enough of them to cover multiple points, 
should they leave their position to be more mobile and is their role to prevent and deter or 
detect and detain?  Gill (2007) states that: “Security officers were a threat that many felt they 
could fairly easily manage” (p. 28).  This is an interesting statement and the offender quotes 
referenced by Gill (p. 28) both suggest that from the surveillance aspect of CPTED guards 
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can be effective in preventing crime, as the goods were put back on the shelf if the offenders 
were followed by them.  Conversely, this does not suggest that the presence of the guards was 
a deterrent in the first place, as the offender had accessed the store, moved through it, picked 
up the target(s) and began their exit.  So what does this suggest about the image portrayed by 
the guards to shoplifters?  Perhaps Beck (2016) identifies one of the most salient points in 
relation to the effectiveness of staff and guarding in that: “it is dependent upon store staff 
recognising and understanding the role they can play and for store guards in particular, 
understanding the importance of not being static in the store and engaging customers who 
may be acting suspiciously” (p. 30).  A key omission from this statement is that guards in 
particular need to be enabled to conduct the job they are employed to do.  
An additional method of enhancing surveillance is through the installation of strategically 
placed mirrors in areas where the shelving height may restrict sight lines.  The intention is to 
enable staff and other users of the space to identify and monitor suspicious behaviour 
(Armitage, 2013) by eliminating blind spots presented by the way the environment has been 
designed.  The inherent issue with the positioning of mirrors is that all users, whether 
legitimate or not, can utilise them.  Offenders looking to conceal items amongst higher 
shelving may find a mirror useful in their own surveillance activity to detect the approaching 
presence of security guards, staff or shoppers.  Countersurveillance is an undesirable, yet 
unavoidable, by-product of the use of mirrors (Ekblom, 2011). 
The use of mirrors in supermarkets in terms of enhancing surveillance, or indeed the 
countersurveillance alluded to by Ekblom (2011), continues to be a point for debate.  Mirrors 
are relatively inexpensive compared to other crime prevention measures utilised in 
supermarkets and are used sparingly, in order to assist in observing areas of concern.  It could 
be argued that they may be more effective in smaller retail spaces such as a local convenience 
store or post office for example.  However, until further research has been undertaken 
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focusing on the effectiveness of mirrors in improving surveillance for the users, as opposed to 
the abusers, then those that debate the concept will remain unconvinced (Beck, 2016).  Lasky 
et al. (2017) conclude that: “Mirrors are considered, at best, to have fair potential as 
shoplifting deterrents, and, at worst, to facilitate shoplifting” (p. 774).   
Target Hardening 
Target hardening in real terms within a supermarket environment relates primarily to the use 
of Electronic Article Surveillance (EAS) or in practitioner terms ‘tagging’.  As with every 
other component of CPTED there are many examples of what target hardening is or is not, 
but in relation to this research it almost exclusively relates to the use of EAS.  Arguably if an 
offender is stood within touching distance of an item that is tagged then the other component 
parts of CPTED have failed, as the tag could be perceived as the last chance to make an item 
‘resistant to approach’, beyond which the manipulation and attack alluded to by Ekblom 
(2011) will take place. 
Numerous EAS systems are available to the supermarkets to ‘protect’ key product lines, 
including spider tags, hard tags, keeper or safe boxes, bottle tags and ink tags.  The principal 
concern with any retrofit product is that there will in time be someone who develops a way to 
overcome it (Ekblom, 1997).  DiLonardo & Clarke (1996) reviewed the impact of ink tags in 
the retail environment and suggested that: “In time, however, the most determined offenders 
can usually find ways to defeat any security system.  Indeed, there is some recent evidence 
that ink tags are no exception” (p. 13).  The principal concern with any retrofit product is that 
there will in time be someone who develops a way to overcome it (Ekblom, 1997).  Similar 
comparisons can be drawn with how burglars developed methods of breaching euro-cylinder 
locks set within domestic doors, resulting in a significant amount of them perceived as easy 
targets by the offending fraternity.  Just as consumers may be enticed to purchase a new 
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product, before becoming indifferent to its novel value, shoplifters will go through the same 
process in relation to the deterrent factor presented by a tag.  It may be the case that the initial 
introduction of a tag presents deters a proportion of shoplifters due to an unnerving lack of 
familiarity, but it won’t be long before they discover a modus operandi that defeats it, 
resulting in the same indifference experienced by the consumers of new product (Gill et al., 
1999). 
The management of threat posed by EAS can develop and mature relatively quickly amongst 
shoplifters demonstrating a natural aptitude to overcome the challenges presented to them.  
Some may view it as a simple test, a sheer position of defiance that they cannot be beaten.  
Whereas others will do it out of necessity.  One thing about the shoplifting community is that 
they do not stand still, they are always developing methods to counter those of the 
supermarkets, similar to a game of chess or cat and mouse.  Tags are sometimes removed 
within the store using pliers, screwdrivers, magnets or even de-tagging equipment purchased 
online or from a connection in the retail sector.  Foil lined bags, circumvention of EAS 
barriers that have been installed inadequately, a simple wave through from staff or no 
response whatsoever to alarm activation also feature in the shoplifters repertoire (Gill, 2007). 
The effectiveness of EAS suffers hugely from a lack of consistent response within 
supermarkets, whether no response in relation to an alarm activation or the use of the tags 
across product ranges.  It is a common sight to see shelves of the same product with some 
having been tagged and others not.  Such apathy undermines the credibility of EAS, as the 
inconsistencies present opportunities to shoplifters.  However, tagging may deter the 
proportion of shoplifters who simply want that extra bottle of wine, the opportunists who may 
commit theft infrequently (Beck, 2016).  A slightly different view was taken by Lasky et al. 
(2017) as they reported: “Our data reveals that Electronic Article Surveillance is effective in 
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the sense that many shoplifters will avoid tagged products altogether, but ineffective in that 
they displace their offending to untagged products” (p. 787).   
McNees, Egli, Marshall, Schnelle & Ridley (1976) explored an alternative approach to the 
protection of products, identifying items deemed at risk and were frequently lost.  They 
specifically examined the use of signs and symbols to deter those who were removing the 
products from the shelves.  The methodology involved the placement of ‘red stars’ mounted 
on the racks where target merchandise was stocked, accompanied by the placement of a sign 
stating: “ATTENTION SHOPPERS & SHOPLIFTERS The items you see marked with a red 
star are items that shoplifters frequently take” (McNees et al., 1976, p. 403).  The outcomes 
from this distinctive approach were very positive, with significant reductions of the loss of at 
risk items recorded.  McNees et al. (1976) concluded that: “when merchandise was publicly 
identified as being frequently taken by shoplifters, shoplifting was virtually eliminated” (p. 
403).  Similarities can be drawn from nature when changes in colouration of certain species 
send a warning to predators, ultimately deterring them from making a strike and assisting 
learning processes (Ekblom, 1997).  McNees et al. (1976) adapted the changes of colouration 
seen in the natural world, in order to use a similar signalling effect within the retail 
environment as an alternative method or product products from shoplifters. 
Cozens (2014) makes an interesting point regarding the CPTED component of target 
hardening when referencing: “gated communities” and: “fortressification” (p. 26) in that: 
“These factors work against other CPTED strategies because they reduce the self-policing 
capacity of community as a whole, and can undermine CPTED strategies such as 
surveillance, territoriality, image maintenance and the legitimate use of space” (p. 26).  This 
notion was also supported by Clarke & Petrossian (2013).  It could be argued that the use of 
EAS has become the default response to target hardening within retail and supermarkets, 
partly because they are readily available and a rapid response mechanism.  However, if the 
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bespoke and structured use of CPTED presented in this paper assists the practical translation 
of the component parts for application in supermarkets, then the emphasis should shift from 
target hardening, in order to enable the self-policing of community touched on by Cozens 
(2014) - an approach that encourages the other components of CPTED to take precedence 
over the final ‘resistance to approach’ tactic of using EAS.    
Using Offender Perceptions in Research 
Garnering the views of offenders is a vital element in understanding crime risk and 
consequently crime prevention, and several studies have done so in relation to retail crime 
(Gill et al., 1999; Gill, 2007; Carmel-Gilfilen, 2011; Cardone & Hayes, 2011).  To truly 
understand the thought processes of shoplifters their expertise must be accessed and used to 
target crime prevention activity, a notion also supported by the Design & Technology 
Alliance Against Crime (2011) when addressing abuser-centred design.  The insight obtained 
from such engagement with those committing the crime should be imparted on those 
attempting to design it out.  The view of shoplifters held by the supermarkets will be adverse 
to say the least.  However, if understanding is a fundamental element of designing out crime 
then supermarkets have to be amenable to involving the very people who challenge their 
environments on a daily basis.  Only by doing that in an appropriate manner that’s conducive 
in eliciting an awareness of offender behaviour will they be able to begin to know their 
offenders and think thief (Ekblom, 1997).   
The perceptions of offenders are important in reducing the opportunity for crime to occur, as 
individuals they hold more information than police and retail intelligence systems in relation 
to behavioural considerations and attractions when committing crime.  A point supported by 
Cardone (2006): “A shoplifter views the retail store through an entirely different pair of 
eyes” (p. 1).  The information held on police intelligence systems regarding individual 
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shoplifters predominantly relates to their offending history, outcomes of arrest, when they 
were last incarcerated, know associates and personal details.  This type of information 
supports investigation and offender management interventions, but provides nothing to 
support crime prevention practitioners or designers in their attempts to design out crime.  The 
same applies to the information held by the supermarkets.  Therefore, it could be argued that 
there is an absence of detail crucial to designers when deliberating how an environment could 
be manipulated by a shoplifter.  If the detail is simply not available, or made available, then 
how can designers obtain the foresight of criminal opportunity inadvertently provided by 
their conceptions (Design & Technology Alliance Against Crime, 2011). 
Experienced practitioners and retail managers will have a good knowledge of what may or 
may not be effective in relation to preventing and reducing crime incidents.  Gill (2007) 
stated that: “Retail experts clearly believe they understand shop theft, evidenced by stores’ 
ongoing investment in a range of security measures (which do not differ a great deal 
worldwide), yet shop thieves argue that stealing is easy.  So how can this be?” (p. 7).  
However, experience does not always equal understanding and the vast majority of 
practitioners who are tasked with preventing crime have never committed the crime in 
question, so how do they know the thought process an offender actually goes through, how 
this drives their behaviour and how they view practitioner applied interventions aimed to 
deter them from committing crime?  Offenders hold ‘black box’ information that others do 
not.  As Gill et al. (1999) suggest: “It is only by understanding how offenders’ perceive 
security, that effective strategies can be employed to deter shop thieves and to minimise the 
harm they cause, both to businesses and retail staff” (p. 37). 
In Carmel-Gilfilen (2011) Verbal Protocol Analysis (VPA) was utilised to collect data from 
24 expert and novice shoplifters, in order to obtain their perceptions of a retail environment 
and identify potential deterrents to crime.  Participants were deemed expert or novice based 
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on self-assessment of their shoplifting activity; 25 offences or more qualified you as an 
expert, 10 offences during the previous 12 months a novice.  The research focussed on 
eliciting verbal reports of thought sequences, with results suggesting significant differences 
between expert and novice offenders.  Although the suggestion of differences is of interest, it 
could be argued it holds little significance in terms of the practical application of CPTED due 
to retail environments having minimal control over the offenders who enter their sites – i.e. 
whether they are experienced shoplifters or not.   
The approach taken by Carmel-Gilfilen (2011) had the opportunity to access the ‘black box’, 
but the credibility of the offenders in the sample is questionable, especially that of the 
experts.  The method used to engage the shoplifters and non-shoplifters (novices) was an 
advert in the local newspaper, stating that individuals would be paid to participate in the 
study.  Incentives to participate could result in individuals potentially saying what they think 
the researcher may want to hear.  However, potentially the main flaw with the approach taken 
by Carmel-Gilfilen was that the background of the participants was not verified, so there was 
no confirmation that the experts were in fact experienced shoplifters or that the novices had 
not in fact committed several hundred offences, but did not want to divulge this. 
Carmel-Gilfilen (2011) referred to previous research on this subject that had in fact targeted 
shoplifters that had been prosecuted, but suggested: “the disadvantage is that these 
individuals were not successful with their crimes” (p. 30) in that they were caught.  What this 
statement fails to recognise is that the vast majority of offenders committing shoplifting are 
prosecuted in relation to a particular occurrence or a small series of occurrences.  A shoplifter 
may get sentenced based on their last crime, but then others may get taken into consideration 
when their offending history is reviewed.  However, depending on the offender in question 
they may have actually committed several times more offences than what they are prosecuted 
for, so to suggest that they are unsuccessful is remiss.  The credibility of the prosecuted 
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offenders is arguably much greater than those who claim an offending past to obtain reward 
for their time. 
Cardone & Hayes (2011) also commented on the reliability of prosecuted offenders, with the 
suggestion that prosecuted offenders are: “perhaps incompetent” (p. 32).  There is surely an 
argument that incompetence cannot be measured on the strength of someone simply being 
prosecuted?  Is a shoplifter who has committed such offences for ten years incompetent if 
they have been prosecuted for a handful of offences when they have committed hundreds that 
have gone unnoticed?  If a burglar has broken into five hundred homes over a fifteen year 
period and they are serving time for five of those offences, are they incompetent?  Kim Farry 
dubbed: “Britain’s most shameless shoplifter” (Aldridge & Wilson, 2015), claims to have: 
“made £2million from stealing”, with the article going on to report that Farry: “has been 
jailed seven times on more than 50 charges of shoplifting, but she says those 50 charges 
account for less than 1% of the items she has nicked” – is that the sign of an incompetent 
prosecuted shoplifter?  On face value, Cardone & Hayes (2011) present a limited view, when 
in fact it could be argued that a significant proportion of shoplifting offenders demonstrate a 
level of intelligence and simple, yet effective, ingenuity when it comes to their ‘business’, 
something that should not be discounted on the back of prosecution. 
A proportion of shoplifting fraternity demonstrate an ability to respond to measures designed 
to prevent them from committing theft.  They display levels of intuition and an astute 
awareness of the environment in which they operate.  To some shoplifters shoplifting is 
perceived as their profession; to others it is a means to an end.  It could be argued that their 
dynamism in identifying methods to counter the moves of the supermarkets in reducing the 
opportunity of them to commit crime, is outweighed by their perceived necessity to do so if 
suffering from an addiction or financial circumstances affecting their family (Lasky et al., 
2017).  This challenges the suggested incompetence of shoplifters (Cardone & Hayes, 2011).  
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Designers have to improve their ability to ‘think thief’ (Ekblom, 1997), supported by the 
desire of the supermarkets and crime prevention practitioners to further engage those who can 
influence such thoughts due to their experience in committing shoplifting.          
Purposive and snowball sampling was used to recruit active shoplifting offenders by Lasky et 
al. (2017), but the ‘pool’ from which they recruited from and the incentive provided 
potentially weakens some of the outcomes presented by them.  The purposive sample 
consisted of college students who were offered $75 to participate and a further $40 for 
successfully recruiting an associate.  Without generalising the student population, $75 to 
suggest that you have committed shoplifting offences and to walk round a supermarket with 
an eye tracker on could be perceived by many as attractive.  Payment may result in a 
performance beyond normal behaviour, and is the simulation of shoplifting offences under 
controlled circumstances going to replicate reality?   
Methodology 
This is a qualitative research project focussed primarily on the applicability of CPTED 
principles to the interior space of supermarkets.  The outcomes of the literature review 
assisted in constructing the methodology framework. 
Qualitative Research 
The qualitative approach was applied to this research, in order to focus on understanding the 
behaviour of the participants when traversing through environments similar to those that they 
used to commit crime in; akin to a performer in the theatre playing out a scene.  This provides 
the opportunity to capture descriptions of experiences in an environment that the participants 
are familiar with.  For this study, semi-structured interviews and observational techniques 
were utilised, with the observational phase assisting to corroborate the data collected from the 
interviews.  This then supported the exploration of which aspects of CPTED and 
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criminological theory could be utilised in deflecting offender behaviour and shaping design to 
reduce the opportunity for crime to occur.  One of the weaknesses of qualitative research is 
the opportunity for bias that may distort the findings, opinions are always open to 
misinterpretation, something that could occur between the participants and researcher.  
However, this was minimised by implementing two phases to this research that engaged the 
ex-shoplifting offenders, in an attempt to clarify their thoughts and substantiate what they had 
stated in during the interviews.   
The research comprised of three phases: 
Phase 1. -  Semi-structured interviews with Store Interior Designers/Planners (n=2) from 
the two major supermarket chains.  Interviews were fully transcribed and 
analysed using thematic analysis.  Questions focused on design principles 
shaping interior space of supermarkets, how crime prevention currently 
features within their design process and their perceptions of aspects of their 
security that deters and attracts shoplifters. 
Phase 2. - Semi-structured interviews with ex-shoplifting offenders (n=5) invited to 
participate in the research via Integrated Offender Management (IOM) teams 
in West Yorkshire.  Interviews were fully transcribed and analysed using 
thematic analysis, and comments were not attributed to individuals 
specifically, in order to retain a degree of anonymity.  Questions focussed on 
their offending history, store selection, product selection, crime prevention and 
their thoughts on the design features within the retail sector. 
Phase 3. - Consisted of the ex-shoplifting offenders participating in ‘walk rounds’ (n=4) 
of a supermarket environment (utilising two different stores).  One participant 
did not want to participate in this phase of the research.  Those that completed 
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the walk rounds wore police Body Worn Cameras (BWC) and were asked to 
add narration to their ‘journey’, explaining their thought process and decision-
making, whilst identifying both positive and negative facets of design or 
retrofit physical security devices.  Participants were not prompted or asked 
structured questions.  The narration was fully transcribed and analysed using 
thematic analysis, again retaining the anonymity of the ex-shoplifting 
offenders. 
The research is also innovative in its methodological approach.  Whilst the sample size is 
small in comparison to other research, it utilises novel data collection techniques.  Ex-
shoplifting offenders not only narrate their decision making verbally, but BWC captured their 
‘view’ of the store, their ‘journey’ through the store and their identification of ‘hot’ and 
‘cold’ products and spaces around the store.  The audio captured assisted in undertaking the 
analysis, whilst the visual data collected by BWC sought to confirm exactly what participants 
were looking at, and where they were within the supermarket environment, when discussing 
the point in settings similar to when they were committing theft of shop offences.  
Unlike both Carmel-Gilfilen (2011) and Lasky et al. (2017), the offending history of the ex-
shoplifters was not simply accepted as a given or as a result of self-assessment.  Each of the 
participants were verified as having prolific shoplifting pasts via the relevant IOM team, 
ensuring responses representative of five genuinely prolific ex-shoplifters.   
Ethics 
This research went through the process of obtaining ethical approval, ensuring the 
safeguarding of the participants, and the researcher, throughout the study.  Each participant 
was provided with an information sheet outlining the research, why they had been 
approached, what would be required of them, their right to withdraw, anonymity and data 
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retention.  The likelihood of psychological trauma caused as a result of participation was low, 
taking into consideration the crime type in question, the environments in which the semi-
structured interviews and ‘walk rounds’ took place, and the circumstances and vulnerabilities 
of the ex-shoplifting offenders.  However, in order to minimise risk further, the circumstances 
of each of the ex-shoplifting offenders were discussed with the IOM teams prior to 
engagement with study and each participant were provided with details of support services if 
required.  Participants were also asked to sign a consent form to validate their understanding 
of the study and importantly reaffirm that their identity would be protected by use of 
pseudonym and that they has right to withdraw from the research; their names were not 
disclosed throughout the phases of research and they are referred to as ‘Participant X’ in this 
thesis.  The same anonymity has been retained in relation to the supermarket designers, with 
a view to protecting operational practices in relation to their design processes or current 
interventions applying directly to their respective organisations; the supermarket designers 
are referred to as ‘Store X’ and ‘Store Z’ in this thesis.  Any recordings made of the semi-
structured interviews were deleted immediately after transcript, including the footage 
captured through the use of BWC. 
Risks and Limitations 
The risks associated with offender participation in research can include a fabrication of 
accounts, downplaying their offending or enhancing their story to overplay their expertise.  In 
addition, genuine narrator inaccuracy can be influenced by factors such as drug use of the 
simple passing of time.  However, the ex-offenders that participated were not drug users at 
the time of involvement, took part on a voluntary basis without incentive for their time and 
had nothing to gain from either downplaying or enhancing their stories.  For these reasons it 
is thought that the accounts provided were as credible as they can be.    
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Focussing on prolific ex-offenders may also provide a different view on the associated risks 
of committing shoplifting offences to those who are less experienced.  All five participants 
had at the time of offending suffered from dealing with addictions, committing shoplifting to 
support their substance misuse and at certain times been under the influence whilst doing so.  
This could have influenced their perceptions of risk. 
Finally, from those convicted (thus detected) risks reporting on those that have been 
“unsuccessful in their crime” (Cardone & Hayes, 2011, p. 32).  The researcher would argue 
that competence cannot be measured on detection.  Is a shoplifter who has committed 
countless offences over a period of ten years considered as ‘unsuccessful’ as a result of being 
detected for one crime?  The five ex-shoplifting offenders that participated with this research 
project demonstrated an extensive knowledge of risk factors and the retail environment.  Each 
also committed extensive amounts of shoplifting offences before and between being 
prosecuted.  Their knowledge cannot be discounted or undervalued.   
Findings and Discussion 
This section of the thesis focusses on the perceptions of the ex-shoplifting offenders on the 
design and layout of supermarkets and the extent to which they viewed this as a potential 
deterrent.  The findings are taken from the semi-structured interviews with the ex-shoplifting 
offenders (n=5) and the narration of journey through a supermarket environment captured on 
body worn cameras (n=4). The thoughts of the supermarket designers (n=2), obtained from the 
semi-structured interviews conducted with them, are also presented.  To retain anonymity the 
supermarkets will be referred to as ‘Store X’ and ‘Store Z’.   
The focus of this thesis is not on offender profiles or characteristics, but before moving on to 
discuss the impact of design and layout on shoplifting, a brief overview of drivers and 
constraints will add some context to the key findings. 
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Offender background 
Participants discussed five key factors that influenced their decision to commence (and 
continue) shoplifting. These were: the need to fund a drug addiction, shorter sentences (when 
compared to crimes that result similar financial gain), the need for money to pay for day-to-day 
necessities such as food, clothes and rent, the ease with which the offence can be committed 
(again compared to other crimes) and the moral acceptability of this offence.    
Participant Two described shoplifting as a: ‘daily occupation’ that funded their drug habit: 
“Shoplifting came from when I had an addiction to Heroin and Crack Cocaine…it became a 
daily occupation” (Participant Two). Participant Four reiterated this, referring to drugs as: “a 
big driver” and Participant One confirming that the money gained from shoplifting funded: 
“cigarettes, Cannabis or whatever drugs I was getting into at that time”.  Participant Five 
provided an insight into their upbringing, suggesting they: “had a decent family, but not a rich 
family” and that when they: “got into drugs it (shoplifting) was out of necessity, not to gain 
anything”.  
Every participant (n=5) referred to the attraction of much shorter sentences if caught and 
convicted. Rather than viewing this offence as a gateway crime, some had moved onto 
shoplifting from offences such as burglary as a direct consequence of the shorter sentences for 
this crime type.   
“If you got caught shoplifting you went to jail for three weeks.  
If you got caught for burglary you went to jail for three years. So  
it definitely came down to consequences” (Participant One).  
Participant Two described the same calculation regarding risk versus reward: “They [offenders] 
know where they are with the shoplifting, they know what’s coming. You know the maximum 
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sentence you can get so it’s kind of safe to them”. Participant One suggesting that, should 
sentences for shoplifting increase, it would deter them from committing this offence: 
“overnight”.  
As well as funding the purchase of drugs, others discussed how they started shoplifting to allow 
them to have access to products that their parents could not afford to buy: “I think as a child 
it’s more about getting things your parents won’t let you have, or like mine couldn’t afford to 
buy” (Participant One). Participant Four provides a similar justification: “Thank God for Mary 
who’d sell stolen biscuits or you’d have never had a biscuit. Or if she was selling washing 
powder, or else you’d never wash your clothes” (Participant Four). 
“…if we needed something like a new pair of jeans then we’d take 
the new pair of jeans…or if we needed something for school…we 
wouldn’t go ask our Mam cos we knew she was skint, so it was 
just like that” (Participant Five). 
Shoplifting was also referred to as an: “easy crime” (Participant One), a crime that takes very 
little effort for the financial reward. Participant Three explains: “One day I was out with this 
kid. They had Hoovers outside a shop and he went: ‘I’m having them’ and I went: ‘How can 
you have them’? He just walked into the shop, picked one up and walked out. Sold it, smoked 
it and I went: ‘Fucking hell that’s easy’ cos prior to that I’d been into all sorts of things. I 
thought fucking hell, that’s a piece of piss”. As well as being easy, offenders also described 
shoplifting as morally acceptable, the loss making very little financial impact on these major 
supermarket chains: “A lot of people look at big stores and think they’ve got insurance and a 
lot might have the misconception that they might not know something has been stolen” 
(Participant One).  The thoughts of Participant Five demonstrated the unsympathetic view held 
by most shoplifters, but one that had changed with hindsight: “I used to hit shops and think it 
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was a victimless crime…but that’s bullshit, I know now it’s bullshit…there’s a victim of every 
crime”. 
What makes a suitable target? 
Suitable store 
The stores targeted by the sample of participants were varied and largely indiscriminate. These 
included high street retailers, supermarkets and specialist stores selling electronics. One of the 
high street retailers was referenced on several occasions for two specific reasons. The first 
being that CDs and DVDs were left in the case (as opposed to being stored behind the counter) 
and the store was set out on two levels, the upper level containing, CDs/DVDs, being less 
surveyed. The different levels also allowed the offenders to move products around the store 
prior to simply walk out of the doors without paying.  
“Places like Boots, they had different levels, so you could pick  
stuff up upstairs, take it downstairs, make out like you were gonna  
pay for it, pick up a few more bits and then walk out of a different  
door” (Participant One).   
Participant Five did not focus on the design and layout of a store in terms of an attraction, rather 
the size: “…we’d target the big supermarkets…when that became a big supermarket, massive 
market, that was easier”. 
Suitable products 
When entering the stores, participants were split regarding the products they targeted first. Half 
of participants went straight to the CDs/DVDs and gaming products and half went straight to 
clothing. The second choice was split between: phone accessories, electronics and alcohol and 
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the third: clothing, toiletries (including make-up) and household cleaning products. Fourth and 
fifth included electronics, food, toiletries and medicines (including vitamins and supplements). 
Participants explained their justification for product selection according to three key themes. 
These were: products were low priced, thus increasing the ease with which they could be sold 
on (many people cannot afford higher priced products); products were priced just below the 
threshold considered a requirement for EAS (they were priced high enough to make the crime 
worthwhile but too low to require security measures); products were a day-to-day necessity 
thus in demand, and finally, products were expensive and could be sold on at a high price – 
making the crime financially worthwhile in relation to the risk involved.  
Participants One explains the first rationale: 
“People aren’t stealing expensive stuff anymore cos the people 
they want to sell to can’t afford expensive stuff. Shoplifting 
and selling stuff used to be a way for poorer people to get stuff 
they couldn’t afford – now it’s not so much like that” (Participant One). 
Participant Three explained how certain desirable and disposable products, such as spirits, 
would be attractive, but that these are largely all security tagged. However, alcoholic products 
that are slightly less expensive, yet just as desirable, somehow miss that tagging threshold 
making them an attractive product to target.  
“Bottles of Prosecco, no security tags” (Participant Three).  
Participant One explained how packs of eight razors would be security tagged, yet packs of 
four would not. His solution being to simply take twice as many packs of four and leave the 
tagged eights on the shelves.  
“You wouldn’t bother with the eights, you’d just take the four packs, 
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you’d take the whole rail. There would be no point going for the  
eights” (Participant One).  
Products that were classed as a necessity such as food, batteries or washing powder were also 
popular targets.  
“I think food is becoming one of the biggest things that gets stolen.  
It’s becoming one of the products that people can’t afford to buy unless  
they can find it a cheaper way. I know a lot of people that pretty 
much wouldn’t eat meat at all if they didn’t buy it from  
shoplifters” (Participant One).    
The final justification for product selection was high value - several participants expressing the 
view that the reward must be worthy of the risk and that, if you are going to risk getting caught, 
it needs to be financially worthwhile.  Participant Five explained that: “it’s better to get hung 
for a fucking sheep than it is for a lamb”. 
“… if I’m going to get caught for summat then I’m going to get  
caught for summat. I don’t see point of doing it for £10 worth, I may  
as well get £300-400 worth” (Participant Two).  
Ineffective deterrents 
The absence of effective security measures, or the presence of, what participants classed as 
ineffective security measures, also affected target choice. Security measures classed as largely 
ineffective included CCTV, EAS and measures to emulate security guard surveillance – for 
example, cardboard cut-out police officers. Participants were not deterred by CCTV, claiming 
that the presence of cameras does not equate to actual surveillance – you can have cameras in 
51 
 
store, but is anything actually watching them in real time. As will be discussed below, all 
participants spoke about the deterrent impact of immediate detection. Security measures that 
risked detection post-offence did not deter because the primary priority was getting out of the 
store, selling the goods and funding their drugs, food or other important requirements.  
“CCTV wouldn’t deter you cos you know someone isn’t sat on it  
all of the time” (Participant Two).   
The use of EAS was viewed as ineffective. Participants described the ease with which these 
tags could be removed. They also discussed the inconsistency in product tagging – many of the 
items at the front of the shelves being tagged, yet those behind, or on the higher shelves were 
not.  
“Look at these £30 each you’d cut that tag off, it’s only a piece of cardboard.  You’d 
just pull that top layer of the wrapping off” (Participant One). 
Participant Three demonstrated the inconsistency with which products were tagged: “No point 
going for any with a tag on when there’s so many without ‘em. No consistency is there”.  
Figures One and Two demonstrate the extent to which tagging of the same products can be 
highly inconsistent.  Bottles of alcohol, one at the front tagged and one to the rear untagged.  
Packets of batteries displayed next to each other on the same shelving unit, again demonstrating 
a somewhat lax corporate approach to the use of tags.   
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Figure One: Image of inconsistent use of tagging 
 
Figure Two: Image of inconsistent use of tagging 
 
Finally, cardboard cut-out police officers were met with contempt: “Yeah, they do look real 
though don’t they…after 12 pints! They’re a fucking joke aren’t they” (Participant Three). 
Participant Two describing them as: “Hideous…I don’t even think they’d put a child off?!  I 
think it’s a waste of time”. 
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What makes an unsuitable target? 
Unsuitable store 
When describing stores that they would avoid, two participants referred to the same music 
store. Their justification appeared to relate largely to the design and layout of the store – with 
cash desks at the entrance to the shop, requiring you to pass when exiting.   
“I think it was how they had their shop set up really… you had  
to walk past the desk to get into the shop – whereas a couple of other 
high street retailers, the desk is nowhere near the door, so I think it was 
to do with the shop layout” (Participant One).  
Participant Five explained that the: “Posh shops were a lot harder…they had it knuckled down 
with like cameras…I’d rather go on the one next door, they’ve got no security guards, no 
cameras, there’s a woman behind the till who won’t say owt anyway, so let’s go there”, 
suggesting that a convergence of measures would act as a deterrent. 
Unsuitable product 
Participants made very little reference to products that they would avoid, preferring to focus 
on what they would steal. Of the few references to unsuitable products, these appeared to fall 
into two categories – the product is too big, making it difficult to carry and conceal: “I can’t 
be arsed with meat, because it’s too bulky” (Participant Four). Or, the product will not reap 
sufficient financial rewards.  
“You’ve gotta think in terms of like how much am I gonna get for  
each thing, so you know, I’m not  gonna be arsed to take 15 of  
them [bottles of conditioner], cos I’m only gonna get £1 each for them,  
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so £15 it’s not worth it” (Participant Four).  
Effective deterrent 
Participants described several effective deterrents, however, for each measure, participants 
remained sceptical regarding the effectiveness in practice. Security measures considered to be 
a deterrent were: store detectives (as long as they are moved around different stores making it 
difficult for shoplifters to get to know them); CCTV that is constantly monitored; security 
guards at the entrance/exit to the store; internal tagging of products at source, and floor to 
ceiling alarm barriers at all exists.  
Store detectives did appear to deter, but participants made clear that once you become aware 
of who the store detectives are, you can avoid them within the store or avoid the times that they 
work: “Store detectives are great, but they also have to hang around a lot and we know that – 
you can tell who they are straight away” (Participant One).  In terms of conducting their own 
surveillance to identify the store detectives, Participant Four explained: “I always used to think 
of it from their point of view to help me think how they did it”.  Participant One described the 
communication between shoplifters as well as local beggars/homeless people, describing how 
they would ensure that information regarding store detectives/security guards was shared: 
“…the multitude of beggars they have round here, they are perfectly positioned to watch what’s 
going on. Shoplifters can talk to them – how many security guards have they got on today? The 
whole criminal fraternity talks to each other” (Participant One).  
CCTV was described as a deterrent, but only if continuously monitored, as opposed to simply 
recording: “If you have people monitoring it then CCTV can be a big deterrent” (Participant 
One). Participant Five supported this by simply suggesting: “Cameras can be a deterrent, they 
really can…if they are used right”.  A common theme running through all interviews and walk 
rounds was the fear of being apprehended whilst in store, as opposed to days/weeks after. 
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Participants stated clearly that should a security measure risk an immediate detection, they 
would be deterred from offending in that store.  
“…the biggest consequence is getting caught isn’t it and not being 
 able to score that day” (Participant One).  
“A the end of the day, you’re not bothered about getting caught later,  
you’re just bothered about getting away that day” (Participant Two).  
Participants also described methods by which EAS could be improved. These included 
internally tagging products at source: “…if the meat is getting tagged at source and it’s inside 
the meat you’re not gonna want to open meat and take tags out” (Participant Three). They also 
described ensuring that alarm barriers at all store exits are floor to ceiling (so that you cannot 
lift the product above your head), and that the barriers are flush to the side walls – so that you 
cannot squeeze behind them: “If they changed it all round by the door, floor to ceiling alarm 
barriers, or at least above average height, cut out that gap where you can get in at the sides 
and the maybe they might stand a chance” (Participant Three). 
Figure Three: Image of alarm barriers presenting the opportunity to circumvent 
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Specific principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
Awareness of CPTED 
Neither of the supermarkets had heard of CPTED, but when the component parts were 
explained there was an indication that elements of them were considered as part of the holistic 
approach and crime prevention is: “kind of baked into the pack” (Store Z) when it comes to 
the design process.  Both ‘Store X’ and ‘Store Z’ made it abundantly clear that their primary 
objective when considering design and layout was the customer: “Customer first, 
absolutely…we’d never make something difficult for a customer” (Store Z) and “…the 
customer is obviously key to everything” (Store X).  
Several participants made clear reference to the design and layout of supermarkets: “I think 
this layout makes it very easy for shoplifting” (Participant One) and the positioning of products 
within the store: “I do think sometimes with the layout of a shop – why would you put that 
there?” (Participant Two).  
Surveillance 
Discussion with the supermarkets produced little by way of reference to the importance of 
designing out the number of blind spots within the interior space.  However, ‘Store Z’ did 
reference the fact that some features would be designed out where feasible: “There’s some 
obvious ones that we’d avoid…if there’s alcoves in smaller stores…we’ve kind of taken out of 
the model now, we’d never open another store with one of those”.  Although suggested in 
relation to the ease of which customers can see the offers presented by the supermarket, as 
opposed to enhancing surveillance reduce concealment for shoplifters, ‘Store Z’ referred to the 
importance of sight lines and that the environment: “…can’t be cluttered”.    
The possibility of being seen by staff or legitimate shoppers was a clear deterrent for all 
participants. Offenders spoke about seeking out blind spots, corners or areas of the store where 
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they would be hidden from view: “Anywhere there’s a corner it gives you an opportunity. If 
it’s in the middle you’re open to view. Everything tends to be in a corner or up, or down, or in 
a blind spot” (Participant Two). Figure Three shows how the building structure and layout of 
products can create hiding places for offenders.  
Figure Four: Image of store design that limits surveillance and creates blind spots 
 
CCTV was thought to be a key deterrent to shoplifters by both supermarkets, but with the 
caveat of: “…to an extent” added by ‘Store X’.  In a slightly contradictory manner it also 
appeared that the installation of CCTV was free from restrictions:  “Loss Prevention and I have 
many conversations regarding CCTV and I say you can put as many as you like in” (Store X).     
Measures that enhanced the likelihood of being observed were viewed as a clear deterrent. 
Whilst participants were unprompted regarding any specific security measure, participants 
referred to several elements that they perceived as risking (or not) the possibility of observation 
and detection. There was some doubt regarding the effectiveness of CCTV – if there was a 
possibility of it being monitored in live time, participants felt that this would be a deterrent. 
However, many factors led them to express the view that CCTV would not be monitored 
58 
 
constantly and any risk would be delayed – with apprehension after the offence: “The store is 
quite large isn’t it, it must have a lot of cameras. That says to me that they’re not watching all 
the cameras” (Participant One).  The level of distain towards the effectiveness of CCTV in 
terms of a deterrent was succinctly purveyed by Participant Five: “I can tell you that a camera 
isn’t crime prevention”.  There is definitely a disconnect between how the ex-offender 
participants and the supermarkets viewed the impact and use of CCTV, one that considering 
the significant investments made in it by the supermarkets could be cause for review.  A more 
appropriate interpretation of the feelings towards CCTV is that it has the potential to feature as 
a prominent deterrent, but not in the way it is currently being utilised. 
Mirrors were seen as ineffective as a method of enhancing surveillance, one participant 
expressing the view that they could be effective in smaller stores, but that in larger stores they 
enable offenders to check who is watching them, as opposed to enhancing the threat of 
surveillance from staff and legitimate shoppers.  Participant One stated: “I think it’s definitely 
an outdated model of trying to catch someone shoplifting and yeah…they (shoplifters) do use 
them definitely”.  
“That poxy mirror is no good to nobody, they’re a favour to you  
cos you can see who’s watching you” (Participant Three).  
The use of mirrors was also criticised by ‘Store Z’: “I hate them too…my theory is that thieves 
use them far more than what we do to see who’s watching them”. 
All of the participants referenced the height of the shelving units and the cover that they were 
perceived to provide.  Participant Two felt that the design of the units, in addition to their 
perception that it is also the quietist area of the supermarket, would buy an offender time to 
“do a bulk and absolutely get loads”.  This was supported by Participant Three in suggesting 
“See these aisles are ideal for putting stuff in bags”. 
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“It’s a stealers paradise…the shelving is really high isn’t it” 
(Participant One). 
Using the actual environment of a supermarket to conduct the research also provided the 
opportunity to demonstrate the ease of concealment.  Participant Four spent several minutes in 
the clothing area validating their thoughts through movement in and around the section, 
concluding: “so here no one can see us doing anything”.  The actual type of fixtures and 
fittings were also presented an opportunity for them: 
“I used to hide inside those circular clothes rails, like kids do, and fill the bin liner 
from the inside, as nobody could see you inside the rail” (Participant Four).  
Figure Five: Image of high shelving units 
 
The height of shelving did not feature in too much depth during the discussions with the 
supermarkets.  However, when discussing the integration of a clothing range into the 
environment ‘Store X’ stated: “…it does create a very, very tempting and desirable area for 
out thieves, not only to nick clothing, but to go and conceal the items”. 
Every participant that engaged in the store walk round phase of the research commented on the 
positioning of products at the immediate entrance/exit to the supermarkets (as shown in Figure 
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Six).  Products within this area of the store are usually part of a promotion and stacked high in 
anticipation of high volume sales.  Depending on the design of this area of the supermarkets 
such promotions can often obstruct the view of the security guards if they have a podium 
adjacent to it, which was the case in the supermarkets visited.  The placement of product to 
invite sales was referred to by ‘Store X’: “…we have some guiding principles of what we want 
as you enter the store, what we want to offer the customer and what we want the customer to 
see”.  This was supported by ‘Store Z’ in that: “…customers have got to be able to see the 
offers”.  Interestingly, ‘Store Z’ discussed a change in their approach to guarding, that may in 
fact be undermined by promotional products obstructing their view: “…five or six years ago 
we moved them (security guards) all out of security offices and onto a podium, more visible, 
what we call ‘front and first’, stop them coming in before they cause us an issue”. 
Participants were surprised by placement of products when considering from a surveillance 
perspective, given that the products clearly obstructed surveillance and assisting them in their 
offending.  
“If we start here [entrance to shop by sliding glass doors] you  
see the Budweiser boxes are quite high up, when you get here you are  
beyond eye level for those security guards. That’s quite nice  
because realistically he can’t see you” (Participant Two).  
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Figure Six: Image of products positioned to obstruct security guards 
 
One area that proved an attractive opportunity to evade surveillance were the changing room 
facilities in one of the supermarkets.  Participants were fully aware that CCTV was not an 
option within the actual changing rooms, which presented an ideal opportunity to remove 
security tags and conceal the stolen goods.  Participant Two made the observation: “Your fitting 
rooms aren’t alarmed are they…see that would be my favourite place cos it allows you time, 
there’s nobody here manning it, so you can just come in”.  The availability of the changing 
rooms as a space to circumvent surveillance arguably undermined all other surveillance 
techniques applied by the store, such as security guards, CCTV or the chance of being seen by 
a member of the shop floor staff or legitimate shoppers.  When discussing the potential to steal 
packs of meat, Participant Three stated: “…pick as many as them as you can, put them in your 
basket, changing rooms, in your bag”.  They also went onto to say: “…if I needed a quiet place 
to do it in, there isn’t a better one is there?” (Participant Three).   
Some participants discussed the worst days of the week for shoplifting, relating it to how busy 
stores are and the ease of which they felt they could or could not blend in, utilising the volume 
of shoppers to assist in their concealment.  The term ‘suicide Sunday’ was referenced by two 
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of the participants, with others supporting this by deriding the same day as: “Sundays wasn’t 
easy to blend in” (Participant Five).   
“Sunday is the worst day...they call it ‘Suicide Sunday’ …you have 
less people in shops that made it more difficult cos shops weren’t as 
busy. Your best day is when the shops are heaving. They’re too busy 
to be actually noticing you nipping in and nipping out” (Participant 
Two).  
Conversely, there was also a feeling that crowded places increased the risk of being seen due 
to the number of legitimate users of the space present.  Participant Three explained: 
“…crowded places, that’s what brings you on top cos you always get a ‘Nosey Norah’ that’ll 
be I’ve just seen them do this”. 
Access Control 
Access to the store, through movement and egress were discussed to varying degrees by both 
the participants and supermarkets alike.  The ‘customer journey’ is a key factor to the 
supermarkets in designing of interior space, planning fixtures and placing product to guide 
customers a certain way around the store.  ‘Store X’ explained that: “…we pretty much look at 
everything, so the whole customer journey as they enter our sites from a holistic point of view”.  
This was equally supported by ‘Store Z’ when discussing customer experience: “They can get 
in and around, get there easily, that’s first and foremost”.    Despite the emphasis on this for 
the customer, there was no indication from the supermarkets that they also ‘think thief’ when 
progressing through the planning process.  
One of the issues that caused both loss prevention and the designers an issue in ‘Store X’ was 
the presence of two entrance and exit points to the supermarket.  Finding a facet of design that 
challenges those in sales and those in security is an infrequent event, albeit for very different 
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reasons.  Whereas secondary entrance and exits prove difficult in monitoring the movement of 
shoplifters for security, they provide a different matter for designers: “…from everyone’s point 
of view stores with multiple entrances and exits are always a challenge…how do you meet the 
needs of our customers…you can’t have fruit and veg in two places!” (Store X).        
Shoplifters thrive on ease of access and egress to a supermarket, multiple exists provides them 
with opportunities if one route is perceived to amplify risk more than another.  One exit point 
may also be preferable due to the close proximity to a footpath, transport hub or busy shopping 
area, enabling shoplifters to ‘disappear’ with ease. 
“…there were two doors…there were a door on this side of it and a 
door on this side of it, but this door went straight, well 50 yards into a 
subway.  Once you got down that subway you could go that way, that 
way or that way, so it were a piece of piss” (Participant Three). 
‘Unofficial exits’ were also discussed by several of the participants, referring to the opportunity 
provided by fire exits around the supermarket.  Although not a thought for the legitimate 
customer, fire exits multiply the number of options for shoplifters.  The advantage of fire exits 
is that they are also a distance away from the main entrance and exit to the store, enabling 
shoplifters to potentially egress the store away from security guards and staff.  Some fire exits 
also lead into the main car park to the supermarket permitting a shoplifter to park a vehicle 
adjacent to it and move away from the site quickly after committing the offence.  “I’d hit the 
back door, the fire exit…security guard wouldn’t leave his platform cos you’d be halfway 
across the fucking field before he got there” (Participant Five).  However, ‘Store X’ had a 
different view: “I think going out of a fire exit is only a short term method of nicking something, 
once someone has done it once you know they’ve done it…so at that point you’re on alert and 
your alert level goes up”.  There is an opportunity to influence the placement of fire exits 
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though to try to reduce the opportunities for offenders, whilst obviously ensuring the safety of 
all users of the site: “…in new stores we get involved in positioning of doors, fire exits” (Store 
Z). 
The ability to move in, through and out of a store unrestricted was a factor discussed by several 
participants. The positioning of products close to exits (for example, in Figures Six and Seven) 
attracted offenders, Participant One summarising that: “The closer you was to the door, the 
easier it was to escape”; Participant Two confirming the attraction of goods placed near to 
entry and exit points: “If people were putting stuff on display at the front nearer the till then 
it’s easier for people to get out”.  Participant Five spoke about the ease of movement in and 
out of a supermarket without obstruction.  They proceeded to provide an example of the way a 
certain store was designed that actually deterred them from shoplifting there: “…in some shops 
there’s like blockades that you walk through and you can’t come back through them…you go 
through one bit and you have to go  all the way round the shop to get back out” (Participant 
Five).  Participant Five went onto say that the one way system was one of the best things they 
had seen, providing the following rationale: 
“Cos you’d walk in and once you’re in the shop you’d be thinking 
fucking hell if I get chased now there’s no way out that way.  It’s like 
the automatic doors, one way automatic doors, you walk through 
and then have to walk all the way round and then go through the tills 
and then out, so it’s a good idea really” (Participant Five) 
In anticipation of the potential response from a supermarket in suggesting that this may impact 
on the customer, Participant Five concluded: “It’s no drama for the law-abiding citizen to go 
round the shop, do you know what I mean?  It’s only a drama for the shoplifters and people 
who want to rob off them”. 
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Target Hardening  
Target hardening within the supermarket environment predominantly refers to the use of EAS 
and the application of tags, along with the installation of alarm barriers situated at the entrance 
and exits of the stores, as well as prior to accessing toilet facilities.  Despite the popularity of 
EAS and extensive use of a range of tags, it was only referenced once during the interviews 
with the supermarkets: “One of the principles we accept and work on that tagging is only there 
to deter the opportunist, we know professional and proficient thieves won’t be bothered in the 
slightest” (Store Z).  The only reference to physical security was by ‘Store X’ who felt that: 
“locking things behind cupboards” would be one of the top three deterrents to a shoplifter.   
In contrast to the supermarkets, the participants spoke extensively about EAS, highlighting 
both deficiencies and how this intervention type could be improved. Participants discussed 
many ways in which different tags could be overcome, and these ranged from simply peeling 
sticker tags off to cutting wires with clippers, carried by many of the shoplifters. The walk 
rounds revealed many weaknesses in the design and application of different tags. For many 
products, these were attached to part of the packaging which would not compromise the quality 
of the goods if cut/pulled off (see Figure Eight). 
“Those peel off ones, they’re like next to nothing really.  The plastic 
cases, which were easy – screwdriver, pop it open.  Your dye ones, 
you can just walk out with them, so it’s just putting a bin liner in 
between the bit and the dye falls into it.  Spider tags, not all of them 
are connected.  With any kind of tag there’s always a device to 
eliminate it” (Participant Two).  
Participants demonstrated how simple it was to pull spider tags off (see Figure Nine), with no 
requirement to cut or compromise the wires: “…cos it’s cardboard you can bend it and slide it 
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off, that’s all you’re doing, you’re just forcing it out of it – cos it won’t go off then cos you’re 
not breaking any of the wires, you’re literally taking it out” (Participant Two).  Tags that could 
not be removed were overcome by placing the product in a foil-lined bag, as Participant Three 
alluded to: “Even if you can’t get the tags off you only need a foil lined bag don’t you”.  
Figure Eight: Image of tagging that can be easily removed 
 
Figure Nine: Image of tagging that can be easily removed 
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The EAS detection barriers are designed to be the pinch point in the system, the connection 
that actually alerts the security guard or staff to the fact that an active tag has moved through 
them and is possibly attached to a stolen item.  Barriers are placed in a vertical position 
adjacent to the exit of the supermarket and are usually around 1695mm (5ft 5”) in height.  
However, as with the tags, participants observed weaknesses in them: “All you had to do was 
that (participant put their arms in the air to holding the goods above the barrier), walk out 
above the thing, the alarm wouldn’t sound” (Participant Three). 
“Opportunists are looking for that gap next to the alarm 
barrier…you’re walking round it instead of through it.  People are 
opportunists, so if you’re not covering every element they are gonna 
find a way through it” (Participant Two). 
The final and arguably most crucial element of EAS technology is the human response to an 
active tag being detected.  An apathetic and inconsistent response from security guards or 
shop floor staff erodes the whole approach to EAS, generating the ‘so what’ perception 
amongst shoplifters, as explained by Participant Two: “Alarm went off and there were three 
of them (staff) round the camera system, but didn’t even bat an eyelid, and that’s what 
happens a lot of the time”.  This observation was also supported by Participant Three: “It’s 
alright the alarm going off, but there’s got to be someone who actually fucking does 
something……you know what I mean?!” (Participant Three) 
One participant made an interesting comment regarding their approach on activating the 
alarm, based on the behaviour of legitimate shoppers in the same predicament: 
“We’d head towards the exit, we knew the alarm would go off, but the 
trick is don’t be too smart and just act like normal people 
would……you’d pause, look at the person you’re with and then look 
68 
 
back to see if anyone was coming towards you.  That’s what we 
always did, the guard would wave you through or staff would – the 
last thing you do if you’re a decent shoplifter is bolt if the alarm goes 
off” (Participant Four). 
As with any physical security device, the correct fitting and user response is extremely 
important.  Tags that are fit incorrectly and inconsistently present an offender of any 
experience with a chance to remove in situ with very little effort. 
“You’ve got someone coming along whose job it is to do all of these 
(tag products), we all get complacent, can’t be arsed…….some of 
them get put on that crap that you can take them off anyway and 
sometimes you’ll find bottles that haven’t got them on at all” 
(Participant Four). 
Participants also discussed how they adapted their modus operandi to circumvent the 
introduction of new approaches developed by manufacturers and implemented by the 
supermarkets.  Participant One summed this up by saying: “…they bring out new 
technologies to stop them shoplifting, they (the shoplifters) bring out new technologies 
straight away, so they can still do it”.  The other participants all discussed counter 
manoeuvres to enable them to overcome the presence of a tag; some would remove at shelf 
side, others would move products to areas of the store they considered ‘blind spots’.  “I’d do 
stuff in the changing rooms……took 2 items in, de-tagged them, did it that way and then put 
the clothes on” (Participant Two). 
Defensible space  
Using design to create defensible space, through either enclosures or spaces within the 
supermarket environment, in order to deter shoplifters from committing theft was not discussed 
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by either ‘Store X’ or ‘Store Z’.  However, space planning was explained at length by ‘Store 
X’ and provided some reassurance that the creation of defensible space could be feasible 
through their current design processes.  There is a significant caveat though, in that: “…we’re 
in a customer facing industry” (Store Z), so the ‘customer shopping mission’ will always come 
first.  
The interior space of a supermarket is designed based on a number of factors, including 
obviously shape, size, storage facilities and service counters.  Some decisions on the interior 
design will be corporate in determining the position of key departments and refrigeration for 
instance.  However, there is also a position of flexibility within each store: “ambient fixtures 
are versatile, they can go pretty much anywhere” (Store X).  Amongst the list of the product 
areas that fall within the ambient category provided by ‘Store X’ were ‘wines and spirits’ and 
‘health and beauty’, both of which attracted particular attention from the participants in the 
walk rounds.  ‘Store X’ also stated that: “…so we’ve designed stores previously with statements 
like shops within shops”. 
Perhaps not surprisingly given the depth of discussion regarding defensible space with the 
supermarkets, the participants gave little indication that defensible space or measures to 
enhance it, had any impact on their decision-making process.  Signage had little impact on 
participants, many efforts being met with disdain.  When discussing thoughts towards signage 
stating ‘CCTV in Operation’, Participant Two responded: “Bullshit, that’s what you’d think”.  
Participant One commented on a sign stating ‘Thieves…we are watching you’ with a back drop 
of a pair of eyes: “So what, we don’t care, as it’s what the average intelligent shoplifter already 
knows”. 
During the store walk round Participant Four managed to access the warehouse area of the 
supermarket by claiming to do a fire risk inspection.  Participant Four stated: “No one’s gonna 
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think ‘what are they doing’? cos you approach them before they even think that. So that’s why 
when we gone in there then I spoke to them first. Most people would start panicking”.  Rather 
alarmingly ‘Store X’ suggested: “…you could walk into any leading supermarket and do that, 
it’s about confidence”.   
The findings present a number of opportunities to further explore the development of CPTED 
in reducing the opportunity for crime to occur within the supermarket environment, 
highlighting which of the component parts may be more of a deterrent than others and how 
these could be developed further.  In addition to design and layout, the perceptions of the ex-
shoplifting offenders relating to the effectiveness of security measures provides practical 
guidance for the supermarket designers, and loss prevention staff, on where improvements 
can be made reasonably quickly.  The outcomes of the semi-structured interviews with the 
supermarket designers highlight the need to enhance the connection between theory and 
practice, as well as providing optimism that this can be achieved, in a complimentary manner 
towards their existing processes, whilst retaining the policy of the customer always comes 
first.     
Discussion 
One of the key considerations of this research was to examine the current use of CPTED 
principles in the design of the interior space of supermarkets, as well as identifying the 
components of CPTED that deliver the most significant deterrent factor to shoplifters.  
However, this research also identifies more fundamental issues with CPTED relating to the 
clarity of some of the component parts and the haze of ambiguity restricting vision to support 
use.  The question posed by Cozens et al. (2005) in “What is CPTED?” (p. 329) remains a 
valid question thirteen years later. 
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The importance of answering Cozens et al. (2005) is vital in attempting to introduce CPTED 
into the design process for the interior space of supermarkets.  The main objective of CPTED 
is to prevent someone from entering a space and committing a crime; quite a basic and 
understandable premise.  The component parts of: Access Control, Defensible Space, Target 
Hardening, Surveillance, Image and Activity Support (Armitage, 2013; Cozens, 2014) are in 
essence methods to resist the approach of an offender who may be inclined to enter the space 
to commit the crime.  Again, an understandable notion in reducing the opportunity for crime 
by deflecting the attention of an offender, or more specifically in the case of this research, a 
shoplifter.  Cozens (2014) extended the scope of CPTED through redefining it to demonstrate 
the wider impact application can have on: “the fear of crime and to promote public health, 
sustainability and quality of life” (p. 11).  Notwithstanding that these issues are extremely 
plausible and intrinsically linked to crime, has the extension of definition moved away from 
the initial notion of CPTED in that by title it prevents crime?  The point being that if 
confusion exists in the use of CPTED (Ekblom 2011) will added emphasis on fear of crime, 
health, sustainability and quality of life add to the bewilderment of what CPTED is all about 
amongst practitioners?  Is CPTED being shaped to cast a wider net, when in simply 
preventing crime it has yet to really establish itself?  Neither ‘Store X’ nor ‘Store Z’ had 
heard of CPTED. 
There is a real danger that CPTED could become a panacea from the past if the mire of 
theoretic complexities associated with some of the component parts are not ‘mopped up’.  
Failure to do so would result in the loss of a worthy set of tools in assisting to prevent crime 
in exterior and interior environments.  However, at the moment it could be said that CPTED 
is akin to having a box full of tools, yet not knowing which one to use to repair a leak, which 
to assist in rewiring a plug and which will assist to put up a shelf, or could each of those tools 
be used for each of those jobs?  Image has facets of access control and surveillance; 
72 
 
Surveillance has aspects of activity support and defensible space; and Target Hardening 
features elements of access control and surveillance: “…all six components of CPTED are 
entangled and overlap” (Ekblom, 2011, p. 5).   
In practical terms, and with the supermarkets in mind, the key question regarding CPTED 
components would be which does what and when and where do I use them?  Unfortunately, 
the answer would arguably be complex and full of possibilities instead of a defined 
framework for designers to work with.  Most practitioners adapt out of necessity, responding 
to the requirements of clients, similar to shoplifters who commit crime out of necessity, 
stealing goods wanted by their buyers.  Therefore, to present CPTED and its component parts 
to designers responsible for planning the interior space of supermarkets in its current form 
may prove futile due to the perceived: “inflexibility in practical translation” (Reynald, 2011, 
p. 70). 
This research has demonstrated that supermarkets place a significant emphasis on the shaping 
of space, ensuring that the customer can move throughout the store without impediment in 
accessing goods that they desire.  Similar to the activity of a shoplifter.  Surveillance, access 
control and target hardening are components of CPTED that the supermarkets inadvertently 
already use, investing heavily into CCTV, EAS and crime prevention (British Retail 
Consortium, 2017).  However, strictly speaking these are physical products, as opposed to 
using design to shape the space that enhances the capacity for surveillance or access control.  
That said, at the very least this provides a platform from which to explore the use of CPTED 
further within the supermarket environment.  Defensible space is a component that has the 
opportunity to be utilised more within supermarkets.  Participants know that the supermarket 
space as a whole is too big to effectively monitor it.  The creation of enclosures (Armitage, 
2013) using symbolic barriers or changes in colouration or texture to the floor space (Cozens, 
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2014) would provide the supermarkets with an opportunity to embrace the concept of 
defensible space without impacting on the ‘customer shopping mission’. 
Access control should be reassessed as a CPTED component, by way of definition, as 
opposed to inclusion, due to the strong suggestion that it applies specifically to an entrance or 
how someone moves into a space.  The nature of the title may also focus the attention of the 
user too much in one area, at the entrance of a supermarket in relation to this research.  This 
presents a missed opportunity from a crime prevention point of view in shaping the 
movement of a shoplifter if they chose to enter and move through the supermarket.  The 
supermarkets take into account the whole customer journey, how product placement provides 
natural synergy and how the customer shops every area of the store prior to leaving through 
the checkouts.  They do not just consider how the customer enters the store.  There is a need 
to widen the scope provided by access control (Ekblom, 2011; Armitage, 2013).  The term 
‘Perambulation Management’ has been used in this thesis, which would focus the user on the 
entire shoplifter journey, just as the supermarkets consider the whole customer journey.  By 
way of design, supermarkets are not intended to: “actively keep people out” (Armitage, 2013, 
p. 25), but they could use perambulation management to guide a shoplifter, as they do now to 
guide the legitimate users of the space. 
In addition to dispersing the haze of ambiguity lingering around the CPTED components, it is 
important that users, whether supermarkets or planners of exterior space, are provided with 
the opportunity to utilise in a more bespoke fashion.  This will partly be reliant on ensuring 
clear definition of each component to answer the: ‘Which does what and when and where do 
I use them?’ question.  Considering the component of image in relation to a supermarket; this 
could be used throughout the store, and will be in relation to the legitimate shopper, but more 
from a maintenance point of view.  However, it could be argued that in terms of crime 
prevention and the very ethos of what CPTED suggests it does, then image can deter 
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someone from approaching and entering the store in the first place.  The same could be 
suggested in relation to a residential estate, the image that a burglar has of an area will assist 
in their decision-making process as to whether they commit crime there or not.  There also 
has to be a framework for the application of CPTED components, much as there is when 
conducting a security review on a site, in that the reviewer will consider the preparation, 
environment, perimeter, shell and interior of the site, so in essence working outward in.   
The flow chart in Figure Ten suggests how this could work for a supermarket and in 
comparison a residential estate. 
Figure Ten: Application of CPTED components: Perimeter to Interior 
 
Supermarket
(Perimeter)
Image
Acitvity Support
Permabulation Management
Defensible Space
Surveillance
Target Hardening
(Interior)
Residential Estate
(Perimeter)
Image
Permabulation Management
Defensible Space
Surveillance
Target Hardening
Activity Support
(Interior)
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Naturally the application in Figure Ten also follows the offender journey.  Image comes first 
for both sites, the perception provided to an offender and as the initial resister to approach.  
Activity Support for the supermarket would relate to the immediate environment inside the 
entrance, how the area has been designed to enhance opportunities provided to security 
guards, staff and customers in natural and informal surveillance.  Perambulation Management 
would assist in guiding and restricting shoplifter movement if they chose to enter the 
supermarket, for instance a ‘one way in, one way out’ approach.  The supermarket could be 
zoned to create areas of defensible space containing high loss products, with focussed 
surveillance on these areas, and target hardening through the use of EAS being the final 
component in resisting approach before any manipulation or attack of the target.   
The change in sequence for the residential estate demonstrates the need to use CPTED in a 
bespoke manner, specific to the space or environment and the dynamics within it.  Figure Ten 
shows perambulation management after image for the residential estate, relating to facets of 
design such as footpaths and ensuring they do not assist offender movement.  Moving into the 
estate, defensible space could relate to the street layout and use of cul-de-sacs; surveillance 
may be enhanced through the positioning of the houses on the streets and street lights; target 
hardening could be the physical security on the homes and finally activity support relates to 
the use of space by the homeowners and residents to build a sense of community, which in 
the case of the estate will then naturally link back to the initial image.   
The image in Figure Ten has been provided to demonstrate that CPTED principles could 
apply to the interior space of supermarkets and how a bespoke approach in using them will be 
necessary depending on the site.  Some designers may suggest one aspect of CPTED should 
come before another; but the premise of working from the perimeter of a site to the interior 
core should underpin the overlaying of CPTED principles in an order suitable to prevent 
crime or enhance ‘resistance to approach’ from an offender.  CPTED has demonstrated an 
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ability to adapt and reduce crime in retail environments (Casteel & Peek-Asa, 2000; Casteel, 
Peek-Asa, Howard & Kraus, 2004), indicating a flexibility that could suggest application to 
the supermarket environment is achievable.  This research and discussion also demonstrates 
the requirement for stakeholders to come together to refine CPTED and ensure that the haze 
of ambiguity is dispelled and that practitioners can pick up the tool box knowing what each of 
the tools does and where and when to use them.  Practitioners should be involved in refining 
CPTED; being active in doing, as opposed to passive in being done to may just assist to 
alleviate the ignorance referred to by Crowe & Zahm (1994). 
Criminological theory definitely has a role in supporting supermarkets and practitioners to 
deliver at a local level.  It could be suggested that some are more open to the use of such 
theory than others, but the key issue is that the concept has to add value to what could already 
be theory saturated process.  CRAVED (Clarke, 1999) could arguably be obsolescent within 
the supermarket environment, as the vast majority of products they sell align to each 
component of the theory, thus it being debatable what value it adds.  There will be some 
items such as pharmaceuticals that by their very nature are controlled, but beyond that it will 
depend very much on the supermarket.  This research has found that shoplifters are more than 
capable of concealing products, whether upon their person or through deceit and sometimes 
distraction.  Products are removable and available, in order to support the needs of the 
customer, and everything from meat to health and beauty products, and alcohol to electronics 
are of value to a shoplifter.  Supermarkets understand what high loss items are, but are more 
often than not constrained by the customer comes first principle that drives their business 
model.  Protecting products by process or physically locking them in a display unit is usually 
a last resort for the supermarkets. 
Disposal is everything to the shoplifter committing theft to then sell the goods to support an 
addiction or lifestyle, it is the driving factor with offenders looking to move the stolen goods 
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on, and quickly.  There are many potential disposal routes for shoplifters, including the local 
pub, online, second hand markets, to other businesses or direct to the ‘customer’ who has 
placed the order.  So if demand is directing supply, then CRAVED plays little part in 
understanding the characteristics of products that make them attractive to thieves, as it is not 
they who crave them (Smith & Clarke, 2018).  The supermarkets view technology as a 
potential way forward in preventing crime, the advancement in smart shelf technology or the 
opening of Amazon Go in the United States may provide the traditional supermarket space 
with new concepts to protect products.  What this research demonstrates though is that an 
over reliance on technology can result in a level of disregard from shoplifters if there are no 
negative outcomes on their offending activity through its presence, which is most definitely 
the case in relation to CCTV.  However, the convergence of effective design, physical 
security interventions and technological advancements in product display could have a 
significant impact on the suitability of a target; either in the choosing of the store in the first 
place or the products within them.  
Offender based research has been used previously to elicit views from those that have 
actually committed the crime (Cardone, 2006; Carmel-Gilfilen, 2011; Cardone & Hayes; 
2011; Lasky et al., 2017).  Accessing the ‘black box’ should always be a consideration for 
any research project, and in relation to shoplifting there are no better informed to discuss 
attractions, considerations and deterrents when committing theft than shoplifters.  Some may 
suggest a risk of truth amplification, whilst others embrace the opportunity to understand 
offenders to enable an invaluable insight into their world (Ekblom, 1997; Gill et al., 1999).  
One issue that needs to be examined in future research is the verification of the offending 
history of those participating in the study.  Incentivising participation (Lasky et al., 2017) or 
inviting participation through media advert without substantiating the claims of the offenders 
in relation to their experience (Carmel-Gilfilen, 2011) potentially undermines the research. 
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Engaging those offenders in research that have previously been prosecuted for their crimes 
has also received a degree of pessimism.  To suggest those prosecuted have been 
unsuccessful in their crimes and lack competence is somewhat imprudent (Carmel-Gilfilen, 
2011; Cardone & Hayes, 2011).  Prosecution ultimately means a lack of success in relation to 
the crime you have been prosecuted for.  However, in relation to shoplifting this would be an 
imbalanced view given that some shoplifters are offending on a daily basis and do not get 
caught for a significant amount of the theft they are committing.  The advantage of engaging 
ex-shoplifting offenders who have overcome their addictions and turned their lives around is 
that they engage for the right reasons, they have nothing to prove.  Fortunately, for the 
purposes of research, they have a wealth of experience and an extensive knowledge of deceit 
and distraction techniques to circumvent much of the security found in the supermarket 
environment.  One point that could be raised in relation to the participation of ex-offenders in 
research is that their opinions could be dated.  However, when their thoughts are corroborated 
with the findings of other research (Gill, 2007; Beck, 2016) it quickly becomes apparent 
whether their thoughts are indeed outdated.  The perceptions of the ex-shoplifting offenders 
participating in this research were as valid in 2017 as they were almost twenty years ago in 
relation to the contempt for CCTV (Gill et al., 1999).       
A positive aspect of engaging offenders in research is that it can result in an elevated level of 
interest from those that they have offended against, which was certainly the case in relation to 
the supermarkets engaging with this study.  The thoughts of offenders hold intrigue that those 
of a practitioner discussing physical security standards and products simply does not.  
Offenders think like normal people, but it could be argued that normal people do not think 
like them, so their involvement provides an insight unobtainable anywhere else (Cardone, 
2006).  If the designers of interior space within supermarkets are to reduce the opportunities 
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for shoplifters to commit theft, they have to be supported in ‘thinking thief’ (Ekblom, 1997) 
and research attempting to understand the offender will assist them in achieving this.  
An interesting, yet alarming, disconnect identified through this study is that between 
academic research and the end user.  The supermarkets had no knowledge of CRAVED 
(Clarke, 1999) or the Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), yet felt there was 
merit in exploring how such concepts could assist them in planning interior space to reduce 
opportunities for shoplifting to occur.  McNees et al. (1976) provided detail on a cost-
effective method that almost eradicated shoplifting; Ekblom (1997) encouraged designers to 
understand their thieves and ‘think thief’; Gill (2007) provided a valuable insight into the 
behaviour of shoplifters; Beck (2016) explored the amplification of risk in retail 
environments, four key pieces of research over a forty year period, yet little appears to have 
changed in relation to some of the findings.  Research has the opportunity to inform and 
assist in the prevention of shoplifting in a multitude of ways whether manufacturing 
processes, addressing inefficiencies in EAS; designers tasked with planning the interior 
spaces of supermarkets; staff training programmes or how behavioural sciences (Sharma, 
2015) could enhance the signage that meant nothing to the participants in this study. 
There has to be a new approach to the prevention of shoplifting.  Stores are experiencing 
increasing levels of loss from customer theft (British Retail Consortium, 2017), the 
supermarkets are aware of the limitations of existing physical security and there is no 
shortage of willing shoplifters to peruse the stores for the latest in demand products, at the 
expense of very little risk or consequences.  The supermarkets are also rightly exasperated by 
the repetitive and somewhat unimaginative call of the ‘crime prevention warbler’ to “move 
that stuff away from the door mate”, as well as the claim from some quarters that they do 
nothing to prevent shoplifting, when in fact they invest millions of pounds per annum (British 
Retail Consortium, 2017).  Shoplifting will never be eradicated, but a refined CPTED, with a 
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bespoke set of tools with clear instructions for those charged with using them, could provide 
a way forward if designing out crime is a more sustainable approach (Design & Technology 
Alliance Against Crime, 2011). 
Conclusion 
The primary aim of this research was to explore the applicability of CPTED principles to a 
retail environment, specifically supermarkets, whilst eliciting the perceptions of ex-
shoplifting offenders and supermarket designers on design, layout and other elements of their 
respective decision-making processes.  When explaining what constituted a suitable target, 
participants referenced the design and layout of a store and the availability of what they 
perceived to be attractive products, combined with the absence of effective deterrents.  The 
participants indicated that the products of most appeal were those that were in demand that 
people required out of necessity, low priced items, products that, due to price, appeared to fall 
outside the scope of EAS and also higher priced items that resulted in reward being 
commensurate to the risk. 
Security measures that were deemed ineffective and met with a level of disregard included 
EAS and CCTV; EAS due to inconsistencies in the initial application of the tag and the ease 
of removal; CCTV due to ineffective monitoring and a belief that it did not impact on their 
behaviour whilst committing the act of theft, or indeed that cameras were effective in 
preventing crime.  Conversely, participants suggested that targets deemed unsuitable were 
stores where the design and layout enhanced opportunities for surveillance, specifically 
where the service counter or checkouts were adjacent to the entrance and exit to the store, and 
also in stores where their through movement was managed by the layout.  Participants 
primarily explained that products with a smaller financial return were not worth their 
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attention, as they would have to steal higher volumes and risk detection.  There was also an 
indication that products could be an unattractive proposition based on their size.                   
The perceived effectiveness of physical security interventions also influenced the selection of 
targets, especially where there was a convergence of measures.  CCTV that was monitored 
live time, tagging of products at source and alarm barriers that prevented the opportunity to 
circumvent were all deemed effective physical deterrents.  Security guards situated at the 
entrance and exit of the store were also seen as effective deterrents, but only if they were 
utilised consistently, solely for the purpose of guarding and had the perceived aptitude and 
enthusiasm for doing the job.  
During the store walk round phase of the research, participants were not prompted in relation 
to focussing on the design and layout of the supermarket, in order to ensure their observations 
were based on their own narration of the journey through the interior space.  It became apparent 
that some of the key components of CPTED could present deterrents if implemented effectively 
in the supermarket. Surveillance was the principal and consistent concern, with every 
participant explaining the need to conceal their intentions to vary degrees from security guards, 
shop floor staff and legitimate users of the store and CCTV to an extent.  Participants also 
provided thoughts on how surveillance could be enhanced throughout the supermarkets, 
including that: CCTV is monitored live time, promotional offers do not obstruct the views of 
security guards, blind spots are designed out, shelving units are lowered and changing rooms 
are staffed at all times.  Target hardening was perceived to be a deterrent, but to a lesser extent 
due to inconsistencies in the application of tags.  The key weaknesses in EAS tagging were that 
tags were loose, applied on packaging that could be removed, in a position where they could 
be cut off, that alarm barriers could be circumvented and an apathetic response from staff if the 
alarm was activated.  Access control, in the wider sense of movement throughout the store was 
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also a factor in influencing store and product selection.  However, some participants also spoke 
about the ease of moving products within the store to make it easy to conceal them. 
The interviews with the supermarket designers provided an insight into existing principles 
utilised when designing the interior environment.  The customer without doubt comes first; 
what they see on entering the store, the aesthetics of the environment, promotional offers and 
how they move with ease throughout the store are all leading considerations. The design 
process for the interior environment involves a number of teams, including those who have the 
responsibility for space planning, formatting and compliance with health and safety legislation.  
Security and loss prevention do feature, but not necessarily explicitly, with considerations 
taken into account at various stages.  There is the opportunity to review design facets that may 
facilitate the opportunity for crime, but a commercial view and the customer will also come 
first. 
Although CPTED did not feature within the design process for the supermarkets, some of the 
key components are already utilised.  Surveillance was referenced during the interviews with 
the supermarket designers, primarily through the use of CCTV.  However, a specific feature 
providing concealment opportunities had been designed out and clear sight lines were 
important on entering stores.  Target hardening in the form of EAS was alluded to, but 
supermarkets knew the limitations of this approach.  Access Control and the movement through 
the interior space was important from a customer point of view, but not in relation to the 
offender.  Conversely, multiple entrance points caused concern for both loss prevention and 
the planner.  Defensible space did not feature in the discussions with the supermarkets, yet it 
is definitely a component of CPTED worthy of further exploration in terms of integration into 
the supermarket planning process.  One of the supermarkets referred to how certain fixtures 
are versatile in where they are placed within the layout of the store, thus giving scope to the 
creation of spaces that are defendable in CPTED terms.  The caveat being that any such facet 
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of design should be customer focussed, whilst featuring the advantage of reducing the 
opportunity for crime to occur. 
The findings of this research indicate that a refined CPTED could be used within the planning 
process for the interior environments of supermarkets.  Sympathetic changes could arguably 
be made to the interior space of supermarkets to make them more ‘resistant to approach’ from 
offenders, without compromising the experience of the legitimate user.    
Future research relating to the use of CPTED in shaping the interior space of supermarkets 
holds some stimulating and innovative opportunities.  An assemblage of ex-shoplifting 
offenders and supermarket designers would provide an opportunity to converge the antithesis 
of opinions in what may constitute the effective designing out of crime.  This would enable the 
findings of this research to be explored further, in collaboration with a wider sample of ex-
shoplifting offenders over a sustained period of time, resulting in a corroboration of the initial 
indications that CPTED can be adapted for use when designing the interior space of 
supermarkets.  The materialisation of plans shaped by both the user and abuser journeys would 
be a major step forward in reducing the opportunity for crime to occur within the supermarket 
environment.     
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